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HALDANE # UNIVERSITIES AND
NATIONAL LIFE



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UNIVERSITIES AND NATIONAL LIFE

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NATIONAL LIFE

FOUR ADDRESSES TO STUDENTS

BY VISCOUNT HALDANE

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THE SOUL OF A PEOPLE

*An Address delivered to the Students of the University
College of Wales, at Aberystwyth, on 14th October
1910.*

THE SOUL OF A PEOPLE

You are students of the University of Wales, and I am a Scotsman whom you have invited here as being not unfamiliar with the conditions of University life. It is in the main with what University life can mean that I shall concern myself in this address. Of the general affairs of Wales and of Scotland I shall not speak. They remain to be topics of discourse by those, and they are numerous, who are well qualified to deal with them. I wish to direct your attention to something which seems to me to touch the foundations of national affairs at an even deeper level than that of ordinary politics.

There is a characteristic which the people of Wales and the people of Lowland Scotland, differing profoundly in other respects, appear to possess in common. They are both idealist in their cast of mind. You of Wales have the

gift of imagination. It has enabled you to strike out some distinctive lines for yourselves in your higher education and in your religion. You are not easily daunted by difficulties, and you act together with an enthusiasm which penetrates to the humblest classes of the community. The common effort made to develop your higher schools and University Colleges has been an effort which in reality owed much of its success to the response of those who work with their hands. In the soul of your people there is what George Buchanan called a *præfervidum ingenium*, a fire which is more Celtic than it is Saxon. We Lowland Scotsmen are also at heart idealist, but our idealism is of a different kind. Our temperament is reflective rather than imaginative. We move easily in the current of abstract discussion, and we are tenacious of intellectual purpose. The *Treatise of Human Nature*, the *Wealth of Nations*, and *Sartor Resartus* are books typical of a characteristic form of Scottish idealism. Probably no other part of the United Kingdom could have produced writers of this type, and, along with them, men like John Knox, and the Covenanters,

and Dr Chalmers. I think those to whom I have referred are at least as distinctively representative of Scottish habits of mind as are Burns and Scott. For they are the spiritual children of a race which loves abstract speculation as you love music and verse. In the case of both races there is present the spirit of idealism—idealism which when it comes to the surface flows in different channels, but is not the less on that account idealism.

To Ireland I can only allude in passing. It seems to me that in reality we study the Irish people too little to appreciate properly what the British nation has owed and to-day owes to that strain of Celtic blood. Differences of religion and habit of mind, and irritation over friction in the machinery of Government, have encouraged the Anglo-Saxon community in these islands to give the rein in the case of Ireland to our national habit of not taking the trouble that is necessary to understand those who have great gifts, but gifts that are not like our own.

Now I come to England, and here my patriotism lays me under no illusion. The Welsh, the Irish, and the Scots have this in

common, that in different ways they have had much to complain of in the attitude towards them of the English. Even when civilisation in England was a long way ahead of civilisation in other parts of the United Kingdom—as it was, for instance, when Sir Robert Walpole was the real ruler of the country—we can gather from the not too sympathetic pages of Macaulay how the English habit of mind worried and galled Celt and Scot alike. And yet, speaking for myself and as a Scotsman, I most genuinely admire this dominant race, even in their Philistinism. They think ahead but little. They are worse at organising for the fulfilment of definite ends beyond those of the moment than almost any of their rivals. And yet they hold their own in the world, and I see no indication that they are in the least degree failing to hold it. They are almost always late in coming on the ground, but when they do come they set to work silently and with courage. They proceed with marvellous initiative to repair their errors of omission, and they drop their practice of saying depressing things about themselves and their institutions until they see themselves again on the top.

When a new invention, like the submarine or the motor, comes to light, the Englishman is usually behind. Give him a few years and he has not only taken care of himself in the meantime, but is generally leading. As it was with these inventions, so I suspect it will prove to be with aircraft.

Being at present charged with some part of the endeavour to see that we catch up other nations in matters of science applied to defence, I have experience of what happens when the British people are exhorted to make efforts in times of tranquillity. The reply is invariably that there is no necessity to worry them, and that the one thing needful is for the Government to spend the taxes plentifully, and to damn the differential calculus emphatically. Yet this very people, when it was caught unprepared and threatened with defeat a few years ago in South Africa, calmly put its shoulder to the wheel, and without a groan set itself to get through a situation which would have appalled a nation with a more nervous temperament.

Well, the English are good partners for you Celts and for us Lowland Scots in our common

business enterprises. All we need ask of them is to leave us to manage our purely domestic affairs and to conduct our family worship in our own fashion. They are on these conditions valuable comrades. And let us remember that they go on periodically producing from among themselves individualities of very great power, individualities that could only spring from a very great race. Shakespeare and Milton, Cromwell (whom I hold to have been in spirit, at all events, a most genuine Englishman, though I know you claim him as Welsh), Chatham, Nelson and Wellington, Newton and Darwin, these are indicative of a rich soil, a soil which I believe to be as rich and productive to-day as it ever has been.

The real question is how, in this remarkable partnership, we may best help each other through the medium of our special aptitudes, and develop not only the partnership but ourselves. Now the Englishman is short of ideas, so it seems to me, more than of anything else, and it is just ideas that we two races, in our different fashions, can put into the common stock. By ideas I mean large permeating ideas—ideas such as have been the

origin of the remarkable power which the Welsh and Scottish Universities are showing to-day of penetrating the people around them with the influence of the higher learning. And in the rest of this address I propose to confine myself to the very illustration which the higher education affords, because I believe that this is an illustration which throws light on every other part of the field of work. The development of the true spirit of the University among a people is a good measure of the development of its soul, and consequently of its civilisation.

I have taken as the title of this discourse, "The Soul of a People." The expression "soul" has a pretty definite meaning. It does not signify to-day a sort of thing existing apart from the body, the "animula, vagula, blandula" of the Emperor Hadrian's famous verses. Nor has it its seat in any particular place in the body corporate. And just as this is true of the physical organism, so it is true of the State. The soul of a people is to be looked for in no one class or institution. The soul of a human being is the highest form of his activity, what permeates the members and

makes their life consist in belonging to the whole of which they form parts. Separated from that whole they cannot live. Although it is nothing outside or detached from these parts or members of itself, it is everywhere present in them. It is their formative principle, their ideal, the end which they fulfil, and which determines them, not as a cause operating from without, but as a purpose working itself out from within their course of development from birth to death. It preserves the unity of the organism and guides it along that course, notwithstanding that the material of that organism does not remain the same but is constantly changing. It is the higher and intelligent life of the organism without which it could not be a human being. More than two thousand years ago Aristotle discovered this truth, and called the soul the "entelechy" of the body.

Now what is true of the human organism is true of the State. The soul of a people is just its entelechy, and the higher manifestations of its soul afford a test of the standard of civilisation to which that people has attained. The capacity for learning and the consequent

development of the University spirit are of course no exclusive test. Literature and art, science and religion, may advance independently of Universities. But on the whole and as a rule, the development proceeds *pari passu*. And to maintain the Universities of the country at a high level is thus an act of high patriotism on the part of the citizens. But not only the citizen but the student himself has a deep responsibility here. When the latter goes to the University, he is an adult and is treated as being such. He has consequently not only rights as a member of the University, but duties towards the institution to which he belongs. It is his privilege to be called on to keep high the level of its tone, and to contribute ideas for its development. To each student comes the opportunity for influencing those around him; in other words, for leadership. Moving his fellow-students individually he moves the University, and so in the end moves the State itself. Therefore I would impress on you who are here before me the reality of your duty and of its importance. Your way is clear—to get the best you can for yourselves in this generally unique

period of your lives, and to strive with all your power to make the fullest use of what you have got, and to impart it to those around you. It is so that you will begin to fulfil the duty you have to discharge now, and will have to discharge still more later on in life—of striving to develop the soul of the people to whom you belong.

To the question how you may best equip yourselves for this endeavour, my answer is an old one—By getting ideas, ideas which, as has been said, have hands and feet, ideas which not only transform that on which they are brought to bear, but in doing so expand themselves and their meaning. For nothing is so expansive as the train of thought suggested by an idea that is really great; and if it has once been fully grasped, nothing transforms the whole outlook in the fashion that its suggestive power does. Now, to get great ideas we require great teachers. These teachers may be living persons with whom we come in daily contact, or they may be dead and yet teach us through great books which they have given to the world. In whichever way it comes, the teaching required is that

which guides to a large outlook and to none but a large outlook. Yet after all it is only to a limited extent that the teacher, be he living or one who though dead yet speaks, can mould his student. There is no royal road to learning. The higher it is the harder is the toil of the spirit that is required for its attainment. But this toil brings with it happiness. As we advance along the path, we see more and more new territory to traverse, new heights to scale, heights which are accessible only by patient labour, but the scaling of which promises us a new sense of possession. In all this there is much of the sweet in sad and the sad in sweet. Yet the mere endeavour, even apart from the result, brings its reward. There is a passage in *Romola* in which George Eliot describes this kind of inexperience of the scholar:—"We can only have the highest happiness, such as goes along with being a great man—by having wide thoughts, and much feeling for the rest of the world as well as ourselves; and this sort of happiness often brings so much pain with it that we can only tell it from pain by its being what we would choose before everything else, because

our souls see it is good." For him who seeks to live at the higher levels of life, be it in learning or in art or in conduct, adversity has its uses. It detaches his mind, and develops in it the sense of that freedom that can only come when the spirit is tied to no one particular possession, but has grown everywhere capable of rising to freedom. It is hard for the rich man, who cannot free himself from the obsession of his riches and treat them as a means to an end, to reach the kingdom of heaven. On the other hand, the mind that is really free is the mind that chooses to submit itself to toil and discipline, to renounce much, and to pursue its course, not as an arbitrary course, but as one of self-development in accordance with law and principle. If we would succeed, nay, if we would be free from what is the worst burden of all, slavery to an arbitrary will which seeks only the gratification of its immediate impulses, we must learn to renounce and to limit ourselves. We must accept the negative, not to sit down helpless before it, but, in order to conquer, rise above it to a larger outlook brought about by what we started from, being enriched by its

incorporation. Just as the body grows by assimilating inorganic and foreign material from the environment and transforming it to its own uses, just as the social organism develops in proportion as it gives rights to new classes of citizens and brings within itself and raises to a higher level and sense of responsibility those who in a previous generation would have been treated as unworthy of civil rights, so the mind of the scholar grows. It grows in strength and breadth as it assimilates what it costs a hard struggle and much renunciation of passing pleasure to grasp. But what is thus grasped is, in the process of being so grasped, transcended and freed from the appearance of being foreign and uninteresting. This is the meaning of the conquest of the negative, and without the conquest of the negative there is no real growth, intellectual or moral. If I may presume to suggest something to those of my hearers who are students, it is to acquire as early in life as you can a business-like habit of concentration. There are people who say that youth is the time to enjoy life, and that therefore much of youth should be reserved for enjoyment while that is

still possible. Now I am far from suggesting to you that you should cut yourselves off from the resources of amusement. On the contrary, I think that capacity for these forms a part of the widest life. What is called recreation has a detaching and enlarging quality. But do not jump from this to the conclusion that apolausticism is a safe philosophy of conduct. In these days everything is so specialised and so difficult that nothing short of concentration of a close kind is enough. No one can in our time accomplish the production of any solid contribution to the common stock of ideas unless he is prepared to devote years to preparing himself and his whole soul for work which will be his chief interest and chief amusement. I do not mean that he will look on golf as a penance, but equally he will not feel it to be a temptation. These diversions had better not be left to become ends in themselves. They are apt to take a very firm hold on us Britons, a race peculiarly qualified to indentify life with sport. But life is short, and there is too much to be got into it, if it is to be fully lived, to admit of anything being made its chief end, consciously or unconsciously,

except that which weighs most when put into the ultimate balance. It is quality as well as quantity that counts.

What we have really got to do, all of us, is to keep keen our sense of fine quality. This sense is easily blunted. And we cannot rely on abstract maxims as that to which we can safely look to keep it whetted. Prigs are easily manufactured, and so are pedants, and each sort is apt to pass with itself and with none other for genuine. The surest way is to select, and concentrate on what is selected, and then to follow up that concentration by trying to work with passion. Without passion, said a famous critic of life, nothing great has ever been accomplished. It is no very different saying from one which is better known, that genius is "an infinite capacity for taking pains." Of course, in talking to you who are here, when I speak of selecting an object of study and concentrating on it with passion, I do not mean *any* object. I mean one which, being your free choice, is high enough in quality to admit of the dedication of life to it—for a time or indefinitely. And here there is another snare to be avoided. Narrow and

abstract views, alike in the selection of the object and in the pursuit of its study, have to be avoided. The sense of proportion must be present in the mind of the most faithful of students, if he is not to be preyed on by the imps of Comedy. That is why it is good to have before one's mind the figure of some great man who has been above this kind of criticism, in that his life and his study have been so simple and transparent that we are compelled not only to admire but even to reverence them. A Berkeley, a Newton, or a Darwin gives one this sense. Their striving seems so genuine as to suggest unconsciousness not only of any personal ambition but even of self. It is figures like these that inspire the University student, and that suggest to him great ideas. In the books they have written, and in the traditions of their personal lives, he finds leadership. In close spiritual contact with such figures he gains the inspiration which will in his own way make him a leader in some circle which may be great or may be small, but which will look to him who is thus inspired as a leader. By such examples, and through the training

which close spiritual contact with such examples give, the soul of a people grows.

In the pursuit of learning, not less than in the management of the affairs of nations, stress ought to be laid on hero-worship. Nothing is more stimulating to him who is striving to learn, nothing increases his faith in what is possible, so much as reverence, though it may come only through books, for the personality of a great intellectual and moral hero. Of those heroic leaders there are different kinds, and their common quality is the possession of some kind of genius. An Alexander and an Aristotle, a Napoleon and a Goethe, are super-men, but super-men in virtue of wholly different gifts from above. The characters of its greatest men are the greatest books the world possesses, and we do well to be constantly reading in them. Such records always stimulate, and sometimes inspire. They are priceless for the true student, for they are his best guides in the search for ideas. Some names come into my mind as typical of what I meant when I was speaking to you of idealism, idealism of the special kind which can bring to unity faith and thought, religion,

morality, and art. There are men who have consecrated their souls to this great endeavour, and, if the finiteness which is of the essence of humanity has made it necessary that we should pass beyond their modes of expression, they have none the less succeeded in carrying the advance of the Spirit towards truth a stage farther. None of us can read the account of the last hours of Socrates which Plato puts into the lips of Phaedo, without recognising that here was one whose words are a permanent possession for mankind. He lived in constant striving to reach the truth, and for what he held against the Athenian citizens to be the truth he suffered death at their hands. When the hour of sunset was near, so Plato tells us, the jailer came to him to announce to him that now he must die, and made this speech :—“To you, O Socrates, whom I know to be the noblest and gentlest and best of all who ever came to this place, I will not impute the angry feelings of other men, who rage and swear at me when, in obedience to the authorities, I bid men drink the poison—indeed I am sure that you will not be angry with me; for others, as you are aware, and not I, are

the guilty cause. And so fare you well, and try to bear lightly what needs must be; you know my errand." Then bursting into tears, he turned away and went out. Socrates looked at him and said: "I return your good wishes, and will do as you bid!" Then turning to us, he said: "How charming the man is: since I have been in prison he has always been coming to see me, and at times he would talk to me, and was as good as could be, and now see how generously he sorrows for me—but we must do as he says; Crito, let the cup be brought." "Yet," said Crito, "the sun is still on the hilltops, and I know that many an one has taken the draught late, and after the announcement has been made to him, he has eaten and drunk, and enjoyed the society of his beloved; do not hasten then, there is still time." Socrates replied: "Yes, Crito, and they of whom you speak are right in doing thus, for they think that they will gain by the delay; but I am right in not doing thus, for I do not think that I would gain anything by drinking the poison a little later; I should only be sparing and saving a life which is already gone, and could only despise myself for this."

—Phaedo tells of the final scene, and how Socrates alone was calm. And he concluded: “Such was the end, Echebrates, of our friend, whom I may truly call the wisest, and justest, and best of all the men whom I have ever known.”

Another great figure is that of Immanuel Kant. One thinks of him as one of the most conscientious searchers after the truth that the world has ever seen. The moral law dominated in him both heart and brain. I have been in Königsberg, and have stood by the grave where he was laid, and have tried to realise something of the personality and surroundings of one who lived a life concentrated on a single end—the search after truth. It is difficult at this distance of time to recall the tremendous impression which Kant made on contemporary Europe—Schiller tells us that a new light was kindled for mankind. Pilgrims came from great distances to gaze on the features of their revered teacher, himself the most modest and retiring of men. One enthusiast, a philosopher of some distinction, declared that in a hundred years Kant would have the reputation of Jesus Christ. But

when we forget these extravagances, and look at the figure of Kant in the dry light of the judgment of posterity, it still stands out as deeply impressive. Whether one turns to the theoretical or to the practical side of his system, his writing seems to have a quality which is described in his own words when defending himself in the closing years of his life against a narrow-minded minister of Frederick William, King of Prussia: "I have always conceived the Judge in myself as standing by my side during the composition of my writings, so as to keep myself free, not only from every soul-destroying error, but even from every carelessness in expression which might cause offence." He left the world a stage farther on in the deeper sort of knowledge than he found it. In the words of one of his biographers: "For those who have learned Kant, many questions have ceased to trouble; many are bright with a light unknown before; and others are at least placed in a fair way for further solution."

I will try to sketch for you another of those "Saints of Rationalism," to use a phrase which Mr Gladstone employed about John

Mill. And this time I will take the figure of one who lived down to our own time and whom I myself knew, a figure not of the very first order, it may be, but that of a great man, one who, himself a German, was able to call a halt to the powerful movement of German Idealism, and to force its advocates to subject their principles to a fresh and searching scrutiny. Hermann Lotze has become very well known in this country, partly by direct study, and not a little by the book written on his philosophy by Professor Henry Jones, one of the most brilliant thinkers whom your higher learning in Wales has produced. Lotze's doctrine was that abstract thought is by itself powerless to penetrate to the inner kernel of reality, and that the ultimate criterion of truth must be looked for in the highest forms of emotion, and in the faith which has its origin in that emotion. He sought to limit the region in which the power of mere logical reasoning can give results. He led the revolt, an almost passionate revolt, against what he believed, I think wrongly, to be the outrage committed by Hegel and his disciples against the riches and warmth of

reality. "Du hast sie zerstört, die schöne Welt," cried out the chorus of Spirits to Faust, and to the apostles of *Wissenschaft* and *Wissenschaft* alone, Lotze cried it out not less vehemently. He refused to identify reality with thought, or to reduce the world to what Mr Bradley has called an "unearthly ballet of bloodless categories." On the positive side he asserted that feeling was the source of the ideal of knowledge, and that, with no other powers than those of mere intellect, we should not reach that ideal or even seek it. The good is a higher category than the true, and comprehends and exhausts its meaning.

I will quote the words in which he sums up in the concluding paragraphs of his *Mikrokosmos* the results of his investigations: "It has seemed to us that everywhere the universal was inferior as compared with the particular, the class as compared with the individual, any state of things insignificant as compared with the good arising from its enjoyment. For the universal, the class, and the state of things belong to the mechanism into which the Supreme articulates itself; the true reality that is and ought to be is not

matter and is still less Idea, but is the living personal Spirit of God and the world of personal Spirits which He has created. They only are the place in which Good and good things exist; to them alone does there appear an extended material world, by the forms and movements of which the thought of the Cosmic whole makes itself intelligible through intuition to every finite mind." Knowledge finds its goal in Truth, Feeling in the Good, or Supreme, worth. "Taking Truth," he says, "as a whole, we are not justified in regarding it as a mere self-centred splendour, having no necessary connection with those stirrings of the soul from which, indeed, the impulse to seek it first proceeded. On the contrary, whenever any scientific revolution has driven out old modes of thought, the new views that take their place must justify themselves by the permanent and increasing satisfaction which they are capable of affording to those spiritual demands, which cannot be put off or ignored." "Rather let us admit that in the obscure impulse to treat higher aspects of things which we sometimes glory in, and sometimes feel incapable of rising to, there is yet a dim

consciousness of the right path, and that every objection of science to which we attend does but disperse some deceptive light cast upon the one immutable goal of our longings by the changing standpoints of growing experience.”¹ Every man, said Emerson, is born to be either a Platonist or an Aristotelian. Every man has a tendency either towards Idealism or towards a Realism which may or may not be such as the Realism of Lotze. He has produced a deep effect on German thought, and his influence has crossed the seas to Britain and America. The theological teaching of his fellow-professor Ritschl, and of Harnack later on, seems to me to be in a large part the outcome of the principles of Lotze. They turned away from the controversies about the Gospels and the investigations of the Tübingen School, to seek in the origins of Christianity for a foundation which should require no metaphysical assistance, but should be its own witness. Whether they have succeeded time will show. It may be that they and Lotze too will turn out only to have opened anew the door to scientific doubt.

¹ *Mikrokomus*, Introduction.

But their work has been a great work, alike in the extent of its influence and in the spirit in which it was conceived.

I have spoken to you of Lotze—not merely because he was a notable figure, representative of some of the finest qualities of the soul of the great German people. He was great as a teacher, whether or not his thinking was more than that of a profound critic of other systems. He was great equally as a moral figure, a personality with which none could be in contact without being influenced by it. Thirty-six years ago I was bidden to choose for myself whether I would go to Oxford or to a German University, and I chose Göttingen because Lotze was there. I was only seventeen, little more than a boy. I remember vividly how spiritually as well as intellectually anchorless I felt in the early days of my residence in the old University town where lay the Hanovarian centre of learning. Göttingen was in those days full of great men. Gauss and Riemann and Weber were dead, but Wöhler was there, and Benfey and Sauppe and von Jhering and Ritschl—names that stood in the “seventies” for what

was highest in Germany in science and classical learning and jurisprudence and theology. Yet the figure that stood out above all the others was that of my old master, Hermann Lotze. I had the privilege, boy as I was, of seeing him often in his study as well as of listening in his lecture-room, and to the end of my life I shall hold the deep impression he made on me—of a combination of intellectual power and the highest moral stature. It seems to me but yesterday that he used quietly to enter the lecture-room where we students sat expectant, and, taking his seat, fix his eyes on space as though he were looking into another world remote from this one. The face was worn with thought, and the slight and fragile figure with the great head looked as though the mind that tenanted it had been dedicated to thought and to nothing else. The brow and nose were wonderfully chiselled, the expression was a combination of tolerance with power. The delivery was slow and exact, but the command of language was impressive. Our feeling towards him as we sat and listened was one of reverence mingled with affection.

The figure of Socrates is typical of the soul of the people of ancient Greece. The figures of Kant and of Lotze are typical of much that has been distinctive in the soul of modern Germany, of its idealism and of its culture. We do well to study such typical figures and to hold them in reverence. Especially do they represent much of what counts for the highest in University life in all countries. And it is in the Universities, with their power over the mind, greater in the end than the power of any government or of any church, that we see how the soul of a people at its highest mirrors itself. Your University life in this country of Wales is but young. We do not yet see how far it will develop. But what I know of the spirit of your people gives me the sense that the soil in which that young life has taken root is fertile in a high degree.

I will close this address with the words in which Fichte, a hundred and five years since, took leave of his hearers at the University of Erlangen on an occasion like this:—

“If a thought of mine have entered into any

now present, and shall abide there as a guide to higher truth, perhaps it may sometimes awaken the memory of this discourse and of me—and only in this way do I desire to live in your recollection ! ”

THE CALLING OF THE PREACHER

*An Address delivered to the Theological Society of the
New College at Edinburgh, on 18th October 1910.*

THE CALLING OF THE PREACHER

You have invited one who is a layman to deliver a presidential address to you who are theological students. It is not without misgiving that I have accepted your invitation and come here to speak. And I will say at once that it is only as a layman—a layman in spirit as well as in name—that I am here. I will take my chance simply as a man of the world who has been given an opportunity of telling what he has found helpful, and what the reverse, in sermons to which he has listened. I may, I think, fairly regard myself as able to represent to you a good many of those who will be your future hearers. I belong to no particular caste. I have had opportunities of observing various phases of social life. I have been a good deal in contact with the working classes, and I have known something of the atmosphere breathed

by kings and their courtiers. I have spent part of my life at seats of learning, in this country and abroad, and I have associated with lawyers and men of business, with soldiers and with statesmen. I have had, as intimate friends, men of science, professors of philosophy, and ministers of religion. If, then, I am a layman in the unusual position of speaking with theologians, I hope to try to use the opportunity you have thought fit to give me without falling into the narrow groove that arises from habitual confinement to single topics.

This is all I have to say by way of *apologia*. The subject which I have chosen is "The Calling of the Preacher," and I have chosen it because, after listening to many discourses from pulpits, it appears to me that there are things which one who is usually a listener may respectfully urge on those to whom he listens. After all, they have to stimulate and instruct others, and there are things which ought, from the standpoint of the listener, to be said about how this must be done if it is to be successful. What is it that we come for to the churches? Come we do, and in numbers that probably

do not really diminish, however the outward semblance of habit may have changed. There is deep down in human nature an earnest craving for spiritual stimulation and enlightenment; the money and the buildings, and the time and the organisation, which are to-day being devoted in all countries to the satisfaction of this craving, are the proof of its reality.

Yet there is dissatisfaction. People feel that very often they do not get what they have come to seek. Many sermons fall flat, and, were it not for a vague but very evident desire for association in some sort of spiritual community, congregations would be smaller. All is not right, and the question to be answered is what it is that is wrong, and where it is that the remedy is to be sought.

Some forty years ago, Matthew Arnold, an Englishman more than usually well equipped for criticism, wrote a book which seems to me to have been misunderstood. Whatever objection may properly be taken to the tone of some of the passages in *Literature and Dogma*, the task which the author set before him was one which he took up in all seriousness. It was, in his own words, "to find, for

the Bible, a basis in something which can be verified, instead of in something which has to be assumed." He quotes Vinet with approval as declaring that "we must make it our business to bring forward the rational side of Christianity, and to show that for thinkers, too, it has a right to authority." Arnold's solution was to read and learn as much as possible, "getting the power, through reading, to estimate the proportion and relation in what we read." His conclusion may be illustrated by his declaration that we should be safest with a conception of God as "the Eternal Power, not ourselves, by which all things fulfil the law of their being." With this as his standard he passed many criticisms on the ways of saying and doing that were current in Church circles in England in his time, criticisms many of which have turned out to be over-anxious. But the book was in reality a very serious book, and, despite certain faults of taste, it emphasised great truths. Much has happened since Arnold wrote. The influence, which he dreaded, of Strauss and Mr Bradlaugh has passed away. The old form of unbelief, the opposing of dogma to dogma, no longer con-

fronts us. And yet there is apparent, even more than in the period when Arnold wrote, the indifference which arises from want of grasp and of faith. Men and women are convinced of the reality of social problems in a way they were not then, and they work at them with the devotion which is the child of conviction. But they are not stirred as they were once by religious doctrine. A century has hardly passed since it was the custom in every sermon preached in Scotland by the evangelical school to set forth, fully and without fail, the cardinal doctrine of the Atonement. The reason of the practice was that words which to-day seem to many abstract, imperfect, and remote, were to our ancestors the most vivid means possible of imparting the sense of reality. I am not sure that the truth which underlay the old pictorial images was very different from the conclusions of knowledge as they are to-day. The forms in which the deeper learning as to the nature of ultimate reality are expressed, vary in different generations with the changes of the time spirit. But the substance, the ideal, which the efforts of each age aim at expressing, human as these

efforts are, this substance, this ideal, remains permanent. What is needful is that the language in which we endeavour to give expression to the creeds should be of a character to awaken belief. Words which inculcate the great moral and religious duty of man towards his neighbour, the sacredness with which Christianity has invested every human personality, however lowly—words like these are, it is true, capable of giving the same sense of reality as did the old statements of the doctrine of the Atonement. Yet in neither case is the form of expression satisfactory. We are probably at least as one-sided to-day as our ancestors were, only the one-sidedness is of a different kind. And if we ask why the disposition to look away from the old doctrine, and indeed from all abstract doctrines, is so marked, the answer seems to be that among the great mass of the people, not less than among the learned, there is a general distrust of abstract propositions. This is not a phenomenon which is confined to theology. It is apparent in contemporary philosophy, and it is manifest through the range of the sciences, from mathematics to biology. Every-

one seems afraid of saying anything without at once qualifying it by adding that his assertion is provisional only, merely a partial and fragmentary effort to express the truth, and is to be taken as nothing else.

Now valuable as this cautious spirit is in getting rid of superstition—philosophical and scientific, as well as theological—it brings with it immensely increased difficulties for the teacher and the preacher alike. They have not the power of moving their hearers that their forefathers had, because they are not themselves convinced as their forefathers were. The modern preacher has not to face the counter dogmas of a Bradlaugh or a Strauss, the kind of prophet whose power Matthew Arnold feared. He is, on the contrary, confronted with doubts as to the very possibility of knowledge and the capacity of intelligence itself. Such doubts carry with them misgiving as to religious doctrine, at all events in so far as it pretends to scientific accuracy. If Matthew Arnold were writing to-day he would be troubled, not by the progress of unbelief of the old dogmatic kind, but by the influence of the pragmatic doubts

of Professor William James, that remarkable thinker who has recently passed from among us, and of the questionings about the validity of intellectual processes which are associated to-day with the famous name of M. Bergson. It is true that Pragmatism, freshly as it was stated by the American philosopher whom some of us who were his friends are now mourning, is nothing new; it is indeed little more than a resuscitation of a definite phase of Greek thought. And as for the doctrine of M. Bergson's brilliant book, *L'Evolution Creatrice*, if anyone will be at the pains to read through the first volume of *Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung*, he may think that, despite the freshness and originality of the modern statement, what is distinctive in Bergson was in substance anticipated by Schopenhauer three generations ago.

Yet the fact remains that, whether the reasons for doing so are sufficient, a halt in belief has been called, not only in Harvard and in Paris, but all around us, and that this feature of the present time creates fresh difficulties for the preacher. It is little consolation to him to know that he is not alone. It is

true that there is as much disposition to hold aloof from doctrines which were accepted as finally established by mathematicians, physicists, and physiologists a generation ago, as there is to hold aloof from the old doctrine of the Atonement. The theories in pure mathematics of the arithmetic continuum as the foundation of the calculus, in physics of the electrical constitution of matter, in biology of the quasi-purposive action of the parts of a whole as the definition of life, and the consequent rejection of the old mechanical negation of vitalism—these when you analyse them turn out to be intellectual efforts of a negative or critical rather than of a constructive character. In the same way much that has recently been written about philosophy means rather a want of faith in the sweeping results of Idealism than the setting-up of a new and different doctrine. Nevertheless there is consolation for the present-day predominance of the negative. Now, as at other periods, that negative is showing itself to be part and parcel of a movement towards a more complete view. It is disclosing itself, wherever it appears, as the commencement of a necessary

correction of what were abstract and narrow points of view. This is notably so in science, where, so far from there being any indication of stagnation, the rate of progress is enormous. Whether we look at mathematics, pure or applied, or physics, or chemistry, or biology, it is no exaggeration to say that nothing approaching the advances in knowledge which are taking place at this moment have ever before been witnessed. And the potent instrument in these advances has been the just use of the negative, the method of criticism and correction, and the consequent widening of conceptions and outlook. Faith in the fact of progress is being substituted everywhere in the region of science for faith in finality of result.

But if this has been so in science, why should it not be so in philosophy and theology! And if the method of enlarging the outlook can help there, can it not equally do so in the case of the practical preacher? He, like the modern teacher of science, may succeed in inspiring his hearers, not with faith in finality of result, but with faith in continuity of progress. If he is to do so he must resort

to the same means. He must gain for himself a wide outlook if he is to teach those who learn from him to have one. Now this was just what Matthew Arnold meant when he wrote *Literature and Dogma*, only, because the circumstances of the time were different, he applied his meaning in a way that is different from what we require to-day.

What he really meant to convey was that we must not shut our eyes to the importance and truth of the negative ; for example, in the form of the criticism of the Tübingen School, or of the broader attacks on the authenticity of the Gospel narrative and the Biblical cosmogony contained in such books as *The Old Faith and the New*. But to this I take him to have desired to add something, which in these days, when much light has been thrown by investigation on the true part played by the negative in knowledge, would be said more explicitly. To overthrow the evidence on which we are asked to believe in certain miracles is not to overthrow the foundation of Christian faith. Christian faith is rather the foundation of these miracles than itself founded on them. The state of mind

which, denying the truth of the narrative of the miracle, excludes also the broad principle of the relation of man to God, of the natural to the supernatural, as taught by Jesus, finds itself in a position as barren as it is dogmatic. The outcome is always a reaction from the attitude of unbelief, but not always a return to the old uncritical ignorance which identified the miracle and the profound truth of which it was symbolical. To restore a simple faith is the object of the great teacher, but the simplicity of that faith he seeks to restore on the basis not of ignorance but of knowledge. A profound conviction of the reality of what is above nature in the presence of God in man, and in the conceptions of God and man being logically necessary each to the other, is at least consistent with the form of this conviction being wholly independent and even contradictory of any mechanical manifestation of what is divine. It is within us, as immanent, and not without us, that modern learning teaches us to look for a divine presence. Now Arnold wanted to point his readers to the higher view of the nature of truth, the view in which the abstract affirmative with which we

start becomes qualified by a negative which itself is no resting-place, but merely the stepping-stone to a larger and wider outlook from a position which is out of the reach of the waves of controversy. And this outlook he thought could only be reached through enlargement of knowledge. "Get knowledge, get 'Geist,'" he said. And to-day we need "Geist," and we must get knowledge, though knowledge apart from practice cannot be the completion of wisdom. But in what form is the man who is training himself to influence the minds of those who will come to him once a week for guidance to aim at getting this knowledge!

There is a saying of Heraclitus of Ephesus which is of far-reaching significance: "Much learning does not instruct the mind, else it had instructed Hesiod, Pythagoras, Xenophanes, and Hecataeus. The only wisdom is to know the reason that reigns over all." It is not, in other words, any mere accumulation of book learning that will enable us to rid ourselves of the narrow and abstract conceptions that are the source of our doubts and perplexities, of the antinomies which rise up like spectres to

bar advance towards light. It is the larger outlook which comes from mastery and comprehension, and which shows that it is we who have ourselves set limits to our grasp of the fullness of reality, limits which we transcend even in grasping the fact of their presence. In a sense all knowledge implies self-limitation. In science as in everything else, it is true that he who would accomplish anything must limit himself. To get his mathematical structures clearly before his mind, the mathematician limits himself. He abstracts his attention from every phase of existence save quantities and rates of change, and with these, *quasi* pictorially indeed, but none the less ideally, he constructs a universe which exists for him not the less because it is only an ideal. He shuts out from attention causes, life, beauty, morality, religion, and much besides. Their existence as actual and necessary phases of the real he does not deny, he simply takes no cognisance of them. In this way he of set purpose affirms the negative. For he has—if he would, with his finite faculties, get beyond the limits of what is immediate, and construct a universe which he can take in and grasp in its

entirety—to restrict the number of the conceptions and categories which he employs. By so doing he exposes himself, in his efforts to comprehend, to temptations to narrow-mindedness. But it is easy for him to avoid them, because it is plain that his special outlook on his world is bound of necessity to be too abstract to be adequate to the richness of the varying and complex content of actual experience. The temptations of the physicist are more subtle and dangerous, for his categories bring him apparently more close to actual experience, and he is more prone in consequence, not merely to search out the negative, which is the stepping-stone to greater clearness and depth of conception, but to regard this experience as confined to the substances and causes for which alone his conceptions or categories enable him to search. It is difficult for him to realise that he has artificially precluded himself from even taking in the fact of life, and much more from interpreting it. He is prone to deny the reality of any whole which is presupposed by and controls its parts or members, as if it were a conscious purpose to the fulfilment of which each of these parts

or members devotes itself like a good citizen in a state. And yet such a metaphor, although for other reasons inapplicable, is nearer to the concrete and actual fact than his own metaphor of a cause operating *ab extra*. For how otherwise is an organism to be explained which develops a course of existence from birth to death, a course which is not arbitrary but conforms to a principle, and in which the living whole preserves the continuity of its existence, though every particle of matter which it takes in from the environment is changed from time to time till not one that was originally there remains? The analogy is certainly more nearly that of the action of an intelligent being than one of the physical relation of cause and effect. Undoubtedly life is real. But the physicist only stumbles into an abyss of bad metaphysics when he tries to interpret and explain it through the only categories which for him are permissible. No more can the biologist—who knows the conception of life and nothing more—penetrate in his capacity as biologist into the world of the moralist or the artist. The history of thought is filled with illustrations of the confusion and failure which

has arisen from the attempt to hypostatise the negative in this further form by extending biological conceptions to regions where they do not apply. The truth is that human experience is richer and grander than can be realised by the exclusive votaries of any one science. Yet their procedure, though its characteristic is insistence on the negative, is a genuine means of advancing knowledge. What explains this apparent contradiction is that their negative is a negative pregnant in which they do not remain, but through which they raise the original affirmative conception to a richer and higher level.

Now I am not, in insisting on the value of this procedure, suggesting to you that the preacher must, in order to do his work, possess universal knowledge. If he tried to acquire it he would probably end in becoming what Heraclitus hints to us that his own predecessors were. It is not so that the preacher can hope to come to know the reason that reigns over all. But I do suggest to you that a man, even of modest abilities, may learn how to free his mind from *idola* which lead him to try to shut the universe into narrow

and limited conceptions. He will, if he is to enlarge his horizon, find it essential, unless he has unusual gifts, to discipline his mind by proper study in what I will call the dialectic, which is not destructive but constructive. Some there are who possess intuitively the attitude which is for the great majority only possible as the result of hard spiritual toil. History records this quality even in uneducated men. Great poets, who have not always been educated, at times have flashed forth that which, like lightning, for the moment dispels the darkness. Genius does not need actual experience to draw upon. But for the vast majority of us the case is different. Only adequate knowledge can deliver us from the spectres which want of knowledge has conjured up. Without this adequate knowledge we do not know how to correct and deepen first impressions, impressions which are often very vivid. In the second part of his *Ethics*,¹ Spinoza, a man of the finest intellectual temper, and a model for those who would acquire the spirit of saintly tolerance, describes the errors into which men are prone to fall

¹ Prop. x., Schol. 2.

in contemplations of this kind: "Thus, while men are contemplating finite things they think of nothing less than the divine, and again when they turn to consider the divine nature they think of nothing less than of the fictions on which they have built up the knowledge of finite things, with the result that what they come to about the divine nature is of no assistance. Hence it is not wonderful that they contradict themselves." Another and more recent writer, Edward Caird, the late Master of Balliol, a man who united to an admirably trained intelligence high moral strenuousness, describes, in connection with this very passage, still more fully the process of the mind in working its way towards freedom from the perplexities that are unavoidable at the outset of its voyage of discovery. I quote from his book on *The Critical Philosophy of Kant*. "Contradiction or Antimony," he says,¹ "is the necessary law of thought in itself from which it cannot in any region escape. The first stage of intelligence, the stage of common sense, is one in which there is an undeveloped consciousness

¹ Vol. ii., p. 68.

of the unity of thought with itself through all the diversity of its application, and an equally undeveloped consciousness of the discordance and opposition of the different aspects of things which are gathered together in knowledge. The contradiction of objects with each other, and with the thought that apprehends them, is not yet perceived, and hence no reconciliation is wanted. The identity is felt through the diversity, the diversity through the identity, and no more is required. At times, indeed, one aspect of things is more prominent than another. Religious emotion lifts man above the divided and fragmentary existence in which in his secular life he usually dwells, and makes vividly present to him a unity which in general is but shadowy and uncertain. But he passes through the one state of consciousness after the other, without bringing them into contact or considering whether they are consistent or inconsistent. For many, indeed, there never is any conscious discord, and there never is any effort after inward harmony. But even where the intellectual impulse is feeble, the moral difficulties of life are constantly tending to awaken in us

a sense of the differences and oppositions that exist in thought and things. And as the mind cannot abjure its faith in itself, it is forced by the necessity of its own development upon a choice between different elements of its life, which seem at first to contradict and to exclude each other."

I have cited these two witnesses to illustrate the attitude which it seems to me should characterise the student of divinity who is seeking to qualify himself to deliver those who come to him from spectres that arise out of ignorance. His aim must be among other things to set men and women on the road of deliverance from the negative, from the intellectual temptation that arises from a narrow outlook. As a rule they will be individuals who are agitated in spirit too little rather than too much.

Let us try to see what the future preacher will have to aim at, and what the transcending of the negative means in practice. There are many familiar illustrations of this which show its use as a constructive and enlarging factor in the constitution of a greater whole than that with which the first start was made.

We see this in the family circle, where husband and wife, parent and child, each grow in stature by the sacrifice of self, and the desire to find and enlarge the self in living in and for another. We see it in the State, where the citizen gives up some of his freedom that others may not have their personalities and liberties infringed by him, and thereby secures his own protection and freedom by obedience to laws which are the expression of what Rousseau, imperfectly as he conceived it, described rightly as the "volonté generale," which is more than the "volonté de tous." The larger entirety of the State, like that of the family, arises through its inclusion of the negative in the shape of restraint on individual action. Yet such inclusion is the result not of mere mechanical force *ab extra*, but of the purposive action of intelligence operating *ab intra*. We see this clearly in the use which the true artist makes of the power of selection and exclusion in his construction of an æsthetic whole. A portrait created by such an artist is no photograph dependent on the chance aspects which nature at the moment presents.

Its expression is rather one which is born anew of the mind of the artist himself. He rejects as well as selects. He does not slavishly copy nature. He seeks, often unconsciously, to realise a larger conception of his subject, a conception which may exclude many actual details, but which places its highest meaning for the onlooker in the subject of his picture. In creating a larger whole he raises the standpoint, and he thereby creates that which is independent of particular time and space, and is so made true in a deeper meaning than that of the fashion that passes away as moment succeeds moment.

In the regions of moral and intellectual activity alike, he who would accomplish anything must limit himself. It is only by the sacrifice of himself or his first opinions, in other words by accepting the negative, that he can raise his level and reach his ideal. But the negative must be the negative pregnant. What the preacher, for instance, has to show is that it is not merely by trampling on the world, but by loving it while trampling upon it, that freedom from that world is to be gained. And he has to show

in a fashion analogous that it is not by ignoring the historical and scientific difficulties that embarrass faith in Christianity, but by setting these difficulties in their limited significance and true proportion, while at the same time frankly facing them, that deliverance from doubt is to be got. In each case the process is that of the effort after a larger whole which takes into itself both what was the original standpoint and its qualification through criticism.

In Scotland to-day the prevailing attitude of the working and middle classes seems to me to be that of a mild agnosticism. Now this is not a healthy attitude. It indicates indifference, a disposition to give up the struggle, to jump to premature conclusions, and to accept the negative as an end, and not as the stepping-stone of return to a higher and wider belief in the affirmative. But if there is to be a spiritual victory there must be, as its preliminary, a spiritual struggle. Bunyan's *Pilgrim's Progress* and Carlyle's *Sartor Resartus* furnish testimony to this truth—yet testimony which after all falls short in its convincingness of the testimony of the Gospels themselves.

No man is a complete man unless he has wrestled for his mental freedom. It is not enough to exclaim, however sincerely, with Matthew Arnold :—

“Calm Soul of all things, make it mine,
To feel, amid the city's jar,
That there abides a peace of Thine
Man did not make, and cannot mar.

“The will to neither strive nor cry,
The power to feel with others give ;
Calm, calm me more ! Nor let me die
Before I have begun to live.”

The teaching of the Christian religion is sterner than this. If man is to be reconciled with God, he must first realise his division from God, and have the consequent sense of failure. He must learn that the way out is to surrender his will and to find it again in a simple acceptance of the highest will. He must realise not only the meaning but the necessity of dying in order to live. Life is regained and peace attained when he has successfully struggled through the valley of the shadow of the negative, and not before. It is only by furnishing him with the materials necessary for criticism of his own position

that even the learning of Heraclitus can help him along his difficult path. The one power which can conduct him safely to its conclusion is a sense of the divine within himself, a sense which can only be awakened when he has first become practically aware of his intellectual and moral finiteness. These things are taught in the New Testament with a simplicity and directness which is hardly to be found elsewhere. Yet while Christianity did far more than any other influence to introduce these conceptions into the world, they are not the monopoly of the teachers who call themselves Christian. Something of a like conquest and corresponding humility of mind we see in that picture of the dying Socrates which Plato has given to us in the *Phaedo*. The great modern thinkers, in poetry as well as in prose, teach us a similar lesson, and some of them have not been Christians. Yet in the main the source of our inspiration to-day, the example to which we turn, is what we find in the Gospels. Nowhere else is the gap between man and God so displayed in its terrors. Nowhere else is it so completely bridged over. Nowhere else are we taught with the same

vividness that God and man alike need each other, the infinite that it may have reality, the finite that it may realise its foundation in infinity.

I abstain from even trying to say how I think you can best work these things out for yourselves. And the reason which restrains me is not difficult to state. No man can accomplish for his brother what is necessary in these things. Each must work out his salvation in his own way. To some the example of a great intellectual figure, such, for example, as that of Kant, will appeal, Kant who laboriously thought out the limits of possible knowledge, and, scientifically classifying his perplexities, assigned them individually to the disregard of these limits. He was left, as the result of a life devoted to patient research, with a noble faith in duty, in freedom, in God. Over his bust in the stoa at Königsberg are his own well-known words about the two facts of daily life that he revered most of all : "Der bestirnte Himmel uber mir, und das Moralische Gesetz in mir"— the starry heavens above, and the moral law within.

Or it may be that it is in the region, not of

reflection, but of work, that light will be found. Some there are who give themselves for the sake of those about them, and to save these disregard riches, health, life itself. They pass through the portal of renunciation, and in the practice of the presence of God they find themselves again, and gain a faith which inspires the onlooker with the sense of a higher reality.

Yet underneath the varying forms in which the individual, be he the humblest Christian or the most highly-equipped thinker or poet, dedicates his life to realising the infinite, the substance of the endeavour remains the same. With no apparently completed result will the true worker be satisfied. Just because the infinite realises itself in him he will be conscious of his shortcomings, of something beyond and not attained, in other words of his finitude. Yet, conversely, this consciousness of his limits will not distress him, for in being conscious of them he has the certainty that he is transcending them :—

“Rather I prize the doubt
 Low kinds exist without,
 Finished and finite clods, untroubled by a spark.

“ Poor vaunt of life indeed
Were man but formed to feed
On joy, to solely seek and find and feast ;
Such feasting ended, then
As sure an end to men.”

What is important is never to sit still and be satisfied. That is always an indication that the truth is not present. It is really in the struggle itself and in that alone that we daily gain and keep our life and freedom.

But the sense that the end is never wholly in our sight is no ground for despair or even for misgiving. Finite as we are, compelled to seek to express in pictorial images what these images can never adequately express, there is an aspect of the truth in attaining to which ordinary knowledge requires the aid of what we may call faith, or the sense of things unseen. A great thinker declared that within the range of the finite we can never see or experience that the end has really been secured. But he went on to point out that the accomplishment of the infinite end consists merely in removing the illusion which makes it seem yet unaccomplished. That illusion can never be completely or actually realised as removed by us mortals. The best we can accomplish is the devotion of

ourselves, in reflection or in practice, or in both, to the effort to rise above it. Were we at any moment to succeed completely we should have seen God, and die. Yet the faith that this illusion is but the outcome of our finite nature, and that the finiteness of this nature is essential to us even in as much as we belong to God, brings with it a sense of peace that is not the less real because it passes the limits of everyday understanding. For it enables us to accept our lot in life, whatever that lot may be, and to say with the conviction of truth attained, "In His will is our peace."

THE DEDICATED LIFE

*A Rectorial Address delivered to the Students of the
University of Edinburgh, on 10th January 1907.*

THE DEDICATED LIFE

IT is your custom to leave to the Rector freedom of choice in the subject of his address. I take this freedom to mean that he may, within well-understood limits, turn to the topics that interest him most and to the things that he would fain speak of. With me it has happened that the personal history of the thirty-four years that have passed since I entered this University as an undergraduate has been the story of the growth and deepening of a conviction. It is this conviction that I shall to-day seek to put into words. I shall ask you to bear patiently with me while I strive to express it.

What at present occupies my time is public business; and it is my daily task, in conducting that business, to remember and to remind others that the end which the State and its members have to strive after is the develop-

ment of the State. No such development can be genuine unless it stands for progress in the realisation of some great purpose. It is a truism, and yet a much-forgotten truism, to say that such purposes cannot be great if they are narrow. The ends aimed at by those engaged in public affairs must be based on foundations both wide and sure; but no foundations are wide or sure unless they are such that all the world can be legitimately asked to accept them as foundations. Such a test leaves room for abundance of healthy party difference and criticism, but it insists on that without which there cannot be real stability. The foundation of purpose in the State, through all changes of party policy, must, if the national life is to grow permanently and not diminish, to prosper and not to fade, be ethical. A nation can insist on its just rights and on due respect from other nations, and yet seek to understand and meet their efforts after their own development. A certain cosmopolitanism is of the essence of strength. It is not brute force, but moral power, that commands predominance in the world. This becomes more and more plain as civilisation at

large progressively emerges from barbarism, and other nations increase in capacity to acquire and to rule. In the result it is the voice of the majority of the States of the earth that must determine which of them can be trusted to occupy the foremost places as trustees for the rest. Armaments, of course, tell, but even the most powerfully armed nation cannot in these days hold its own without a certain measure of assent from those around. And perhaps the time is near when armaments will count for so much less than is the case to-day, that they will tend to diminish, and ultimately to become extinct. I am not so sanguine as to believe that the good impulses of even what I firmly believe to be the majority of men will prove the sole or even the proximate influence in bringing this about. The appallingly increased effectiveness of the means of destruction, to which the advancing science of war is yearly adding, and the accompanying increase in the burden of cost, are progressively cogent arguments. The whole system tends to work its way to its own abolition. What can most help and give free scope to this tendency is the genuine

acceptance by the nations of a common purpose of deliverance from the burden—a purpose which the necessities of their citizens will surely bring, however slowly, into operation.

It is not, therefore, merely after brute power that a nation can in these days safely set itself to strive. Leadership among the peoples of the earth depends on the possession of a deeper insight. In national as in private life the power of domination depends on individuality—the individuality that baffles description and much more definition, because it combines qualities that, taken in isolation, are apparently contradictory. Among the States, as among their private citizens, the individuality that is most formidable is formidable because of qualities that are not merely physical. It commands respect and submission because it impresses on those with whom it comes in daily contact a sense of largeness and of moral and intellectual power. Such qualities may, and generally do, carry with them skill in armaments. This, however, is a consequence, and not a cause. It was the moral and intellectual equipment of Greece and Rome

that made them world-powers. So it has been with Japan in our own time. And without moral and intellectual equipment of the highest order no nation can to-day remain a world-power. The Turks, who in the sixteenth century were perhaps the most formidable people in Europe, are a case in point.

But if this be so, then the first purpose of a nation—and especially, in these days of growth all round, of a modern nation—ought to be to concentrate its energies on its moral and intellectual development. And this means that because, as the instruments of this development, it requires leaders, it must apply itself to providing the schools where alone leaders can be adequately trained. The so-called heaven-born leader has a genius so strong that he will come to the front by sheer force of that genius almost wherever his lot be cast, for he is heaven-born in the sense that he is not like other men. But in these days of specialised function a nation requires many leaders of a type less rare—subordinates who obediently accept the higher command and carry it out, but who still are, relatively speaking, leaders.

Such men cannot, for by far the greater part, be men of genius; and yet the part they play is necessary, and because it is necessary the State must provide for their production and their nurture. At this point the history of the modern State shows that the University plays an important part. The elementary school raises our people to the level at which they may become skilled workers. The secondary school assists to develop a much smaller but still large class of well-educated citizens. But for the production of that limited body of men and women whose calling requires high talent, the University or its equivalent alone suffices. Moreover, the University does more. For it is the almost indispensable portal to the career of the highest and most exceptionally trained type of citizen. Not knowledge, not high quality, sought for the sake of some price to be obtained for them, but knowledge and quality for the sake of knowledge and quality are what are essential, and what the University must seek to produce. If Universities exist in sufficient numbers and strive genuinely to foster, as the outcome of their training, the

moral and intellectual virtue which is to be its own reward, the humanity which has the ethical significance that ought to be inseparable from high culture, then the State need not despair. For from among men who have attained to this level their will, if there be a sufficient supply of them, emerge those who have that power of command which is born of penetrating insight. Such a power generally carries in its train the gift of organisation, and organisation is one of the foundations of national strength.

About the capacity to organise I wish to say something before I pass on. It is a gift of far-reaching significance. It is operative alike in private and in public life, and it imports two separate stages in its application. The first is that of taking thought and fashioning a comprehensive plan, and the second is the putting into operation the plan so fashioned. The success of what is done depends on the thoroughness of the thinking that underlies it. The thought itself is never complete apart from its execution, for in the course of execution it is brought to the test, and may even modify and refashion itself. The most perfect

scientific treatise, the most finished work of art, has to a great extent become what it is only in the actual execution. And yet the result has in reality been but the development of what had to be there before the start was made. The greatest statesmen and the greatest generals are those who have adapted their plans to circumstances, and yet the capacity for forming plans in advance has been of the essence of their greatness.

Now, it often happens in organisation on a great scale that the work of fashioning the broad features of the plan is done by one man or one set of men, and the work of realising the ideas so matured by another. For any task that is very great, and must extend over much time, co-operation is essential. The thinker and the man of action must work in close conjunction, but they need not be, and generally cannot be, the same person, nor need they live at the same time. The history of perhaps the most remarkable case of organisation based on culture—the case of Germany in the nineteenth century—is highly suggestive on this point. For the beginning of the story we must turn back to the beginning of the

nineteenth century. After the Battle of Jena, Germany was under the heel of Napoleon. From the point of view of brute force she was crushed. In vain she shook at her chains; the man was too strong for her. But there is a power that is greater than that of the sword—the power of the spirit. The world was now to witness the wonderful might of thought. Germany was weak and poor, and she had no Frederick the Great to raise her. But she had a possession that, even from a material standpoint, was to prove of far greater importance to her in the long run. Since the best days of ancient Greece there had been no such galaxy of profound thinkers as those who were to be found in Berlin, and Weimar, and Jena, gazing on the smoking ruins which Napoleon had left behind. Beaten soldiers and second-rate politicians gave place to some of the greatest philosophers and poets that the world has seen for 2000 years. These men re-fashioned the conception of the State, and through their disciples there penetrated to the public the thought that the life of the State, with its controlling power for good, was as real and as great as the life of the individual.

Men and women were taught to feel that in the law and order which could be brought about by the general will alone was freedom in the deepest and truest sense to be found—the freedom which was to be realised only by those who had accepted whole-heartedly the largest ends in place of particular and selfish aspirations. The State obtained through this teaching a new significance in relation to moral order, and this new significance began gradually to be grasped by the people. The best of them learned a yet farther-reaching lesson, that none but the largest outlook can suffice for the discovery of the meaning of life or the attainment of peace of soul. It is not in some world apart that the infinite is to be sought, but here and now, in the duties that lie next to each. No longer need men sit down and long for something afar from the scene of their toil, something that by its very nature as abstract and apart can never be reached. The end is already attained in the striving to realise it. Faust at last discovered happiness at the very end of his career. But it was not an external good reached that made him for the first time exclaim to a passing moment,

“Stay, thou art fair!” It was the flashing on his mind of a great truth: “That man alone attains to life and freedom who daily has to conquer them anew.” The true leader must teach to his countrymen the gospel of the wide outlook. He must bid them live the larger life, be unselfish, be helpful, be reverent. But he must teach them yet more. He must fill the minds of those who hear him, even of such as are in the depths of national despair, with the sense of the greatness of which human nature is capable.

Such was the lesson taught to downcast Germany at the beginning of last century. It was taught by a succession of great men. The world has hardly before seen a formative influence so powerful brought to bear on the youth of a nation. Its strength lay in the wonderful combination, directed to a common end, of genius of the most diverse kind. In science, in philosophy, in theology, in poetry, in music, the Higher Command was given and obeyed, and the subordinate leaders, penetrated by great ideas, set to work animated by the same spirit. One notable result was the life which, almost from the first, was breathed

into the Universities of Germany. The new ideas dominated them, and they were to remain dominated by these ideas for nearly half a century. Along with a conception of the reality and importance of the State, which was of almost exaggerated magnitude, there grew up the reverent acceptance of the necessity of thought as a preliminary to action. The result was a tendency to organisation in every direction, and the rule of the organising spirit. This took hold as it had never before taken hold of any nation. The great thinkers and their disciples were quick to perceive that if Germany could not as she was rival France, with Napoleon as the leader of the French nation, she might yet evolve in course of time a military organisation to whose perfection no limit could be set. Scharnhorst and Clausewitz showed the way, and began the work which was to be completed by Moltke and Roon and Bismarck. But it was not to military organisation that the German mind turned first of all. The leaders saw clearly that education was the key to all advance, and they set to work to prepare for the education of the people. The work took sixty years to

complete, but completed it was at last, with a thoroughness the like of which the world has hardly seen elsewhere. For again the spirit of organisation, of the systematic action which is based on preliminary and systematic thinking, was at work. The German scheme of education stands out to-day as a single whole, containing within itself its three great stages. As a triumph of the spirit of organisation it is unrivalled, except by that wonderful outcome of scientific arrangement—the German Army. And the means by which all these things were called into existence and brought about was chiefly the co-operation of the University with the State in producing the men who were to lead and to develop the organisation.

Germany is to-day immersed in practical affairs. But she cherishes the educational and military institutions, of which the great figures of the early nineteenth century were the real founders. The development of her technical high schools and of her navy, under the brilliant leadership of the Emperor William II., shows that she has not lost the faculty which came to her through them. When the lesson of self-organisation is once learned by a

people, it is not readily forgotten. The habit survives the effort that initiated it. But this has another side, the drawback of which must not be overlooked. Recent German literature points to effects of organisation on the history of German life other than those I have spoken of. When a leader of genius comes forward, the people may bow before him, and surrender their wills, and eagerly obey. Such was the response to the great German leaders of thought of a century since. But men like these dominated because they inspired, and lifted those they inspired to a new sense of freedom gained. To obey the commanding voice was to rise to a further and wider outlook, and to gain a fresh purpose. Organisation, were it in daily affairs, or in the national life, or in the pursuit of learning, was a consequence and not a cause. But this happy state of things by degrees passed, as its novelty and the original leaders passed away. It revived for a time later in its national aspect under the inspiration of the struggle for German unity and supremacy. But, so far as the lead in the region of pure intellect was concerned, the great pioneers had nearly all

gone by 1832, and the schools of thought which they had founded had begun rapidly to break up. What did remain were the Universities, and these bore on the torch. Yet even the Universities could not avert a change which was gradually setting in. After 1832 the source of the movement ceased for the time to be personality. A great policy had become merged in habit, and was now the routine of the life of the State. As a consequence, the deadening effect of officialdom had begun to make itself felt. To-day in Germany there are murmurs to be heard on many sides about the extent to which the life and freedom of the individual citizen are hemmed in by the State supervision and control which surround him, and which endure almost from the cradle to the grave. The long period of practically enforced attendance at the secondary school for him who seeks to make anything of life; the terror of failure in that leaving examination, to fail in which threatens to end the young man's career; the feeling that the effect on life of compulsory military service cannot be certainly estimated; the State supervision and control of the citizen

in later days; all these are leading some Germans to raise the question whether a great policy has not been pushed forward beyond the limits within which it must be kept, if initiative and self-reliance are not to be arrested in their growth. Where we in this country are most formidable as competitors with the Germans is in our dealings with the unforeseen situations which are always suddenly arising in national life, political and commercial alike. We are trained to depend, not on the State, which gives us, perhaps, too little help, but on ourselves. So it has been notably in the story of our Colonial development. The habit of self-reliance and of looking to nothing behind for support has developed with us the capacity of individual initiative and of rule in uncivilised surroundings in a way which makes some reflecting Germans pause and ask whether all is well with them. They point to our great Public Schools, and compare them with their own great secondary schools. They are, many of them, asking to-day whether the German gymnasium, with its faultlessly complete system not only of teaching but of moulding youth, really compares altogether

favourably with our unorganised Eton and Harrow, where learning may be loose, but where the boys rule themselves as in a small State, and are encouraged by the teachers to do so. Thus, declare some of the modern German critics, are leaders of men produced and nurtured, with the result that they rule wherever they go, and that when they migrate to distant lands they love their school and their country in a way that is not possible for the German of to-day, who has not in the same fashion known what it is to rely on himself alone.¹

I do not desire either to extol or to detract from the spectacle which our great commercial and political rival on the continent of Europe presents. She has to learn from us, as well as we from her. I would only point to the lesson she has taught us of the value of organisation and the part the Universities have played in it. Like all valuable principles, that of the duty to organise may be ridden too hard, but into this danger our national characteristics are not likely to let us fall. But

¹ Cf. Ludwig Gurlitt, *Der Deutsche und sein Vaterland*. Berlin, 1903.

let us turn from the contemplation of these ideals to the actualities of our Scottish University life, and glance at the possibilities which that life affords. You are, most of you, the sons and daughters of parents whose care has been that you should have the higher education. Riches were not theirs. Perhaps a struggle has been necessary in order to give you your chance. Some of the best of you strive hard to lighten the burden and to make yourselves self-supporting. Bursaries and scholarships and employment in private teaching are the aids to which many of you look. Most of you have to content yourselves with necessaries and cannot ask for luxuries, nor do the most eminent among you seek these. Learning is a jealous mistress. The life of the scholar makes more demand for concentration than any other life. He who would really live in the spirit of the classics must toil hard to attain that sense of easy mastery of their language which is vital to his endeavour. The mathematician and the physicist who seek to wield the potent instruments of the higher analysis, must labour long and devotedly. To contribute to the sum total of

science by original research demands not only many hours of the day spent in the laboratory, but, as a rule, vast reading in addition, and that in several languages. The student of philosophy must live for and think of little else before he can get rid of the habit of unconsciously applying in his inquiries categories which are inapplicable to their subject matter. For he has to learn that it is not only in practical life that the abstract and narrow mind is a hindrance to progress, and an obstacle in the way to reality.

And as it is with the finished scholar so it is even with the beginner. He is subject to the same temptations, is apt to be deflected by the same tendencies. Nothing but the passion for excellence, the domination of a single purpose which admits of no foreign intrusion, can suffice for him who would reach the heights. As the older man moulds his life in order that he may pursue his way apart from the distractions of the commonplace, so it is with the best students in the University. They live for their work, and as far as can be, for that alone. They choose their companions with a view to the stimulus of contact with

a sympathetic mind. Social intercourse is a means to an end, and that end is the pursuit of the object for which the best kind of student has come to the University. His aim is to grow in mental stature and to enlarge his outlook. This he seeks after quite simply and without affectation, and the reason is that what he aims at is an end in itself, which he follows reverently and with single-minded devotion. I am speaking of men such as I used to observe daily in this University thirty years ago, and I doubt not—nay, I know—that the breed is not extinct, and that my native Scotland sends to-day to the portals of the old walls just such material as she did a generation since.

In no other way of life, not even in those which witness the busy chase after wealth and political power, is such concentration to be found as is required in the way of life of the genuine student. Whether he be professor or undergraduate, the same thing is demanded of him. He must train himself away from the idea of spending much time on amusement unconnected with his work. His field of study may be wide; he may find rest in the

very variety of what he is constantly exploring. But the level of effort must ever be high if he is to make the most of the short span of existence. Art is long, and Life is short. The night in which no man can work comes quickly enough to us all. The other day I read some reports which had been procured for me of the fashion in which the Japanese Government had provided for the training of the officers who led their countrymen to victory on the plains and in the passes of Manchuria. There were recorded in these dry official reports things that impressed me much. In the first place, the Japanese explicitly base the whole of the training which they give to their officers on a very high code of ethics and of chivalry. To learn to obey is a duty as important as to learn to command. The future officer is taken while he is still young, and in his cadet corps the boy who is a born leader is systematically taught to submit to the command of him who may be feeble and even incompetent, but whom he is forbidden to despise. What is aimed at is to produce the sense that it is the corps as a whole for which the individual must live, and, if neces-

sary, die, and that against this corps no individual claim ought to be asserted. Self-effacement, the obligation of truthfulness, devotion to the service of his nation, these are the ethical lessons in which the young Japanese officer is instructed with a thoroughness and a courage which, so far as I know, has no parallel in our time. He must rise early, abstain from luxuries, cultivate the habit of being always busy. Amusements, as such, seem to be unknown in the Japanese officers' school. Recreation takes the shape either of exercises of a kind which are useful for military purposes, or of change of studies. Whether any nation can continuously produce generation after generation of officers trained up to this high level, I know not. What is certain is that such training has been practised in Japan during this generation. The result is to be found in the descriptions of those who were witnesses of the fashion in which the trenches of the Russians were stormed at Liaoyang and Mukden. I do not quote this case because it illustrates some extreme of the capacity of human nature. On the contrary, this kind of concentration has at all periods

of the world's intellectual history been demanded of and freely given by the scholar. We learn from his example that when once the highest motives become operative they prove the most powerful of all. Just as men will die for their religion, so history proves that they will gladly lay their entire lives without reserve on the altar of learning. One sees this much more frequently than is currently realised in the Universities themselves. Youth is the time of idealism, and idealism is the most potent of motives. The student who is conscious that his opportunity has been purchased for him, not merely by his own sacrifices, but by sacrifices on the part of those who are nearest and dearest, has a strong stimulus to that idealism. That is one of the sources of strength in our Scottish Universities, the Universities of which Edinburgh presents a noble type. I have myself witnessed, in days gone by, individual concentration more intense than even that of the Japanese officer, because it was purely voluntary concentration, and not of action merely, but of spirit. I have known among my personal friends in this University such

dedication of life as rivalled the best recorded in the biographies. When the passion for excellence is once in full swing, it knows no limits. It dominates as no baser passion can, for it is the outcome of the faith that can move mountains.

To my mind, the first problem in the organisation of a University ought to be how to encourage this kind of spirit. Noble characters are not numerous, but they are more numerous than we are generally aware. In every walk of life we may observe them if we have eyes to see. Such nobility is the monopoly neither of peer nor of peasant. It belongs to human nature as such, and to that side of it which is divine. We may seek for it in the University as hopefully as we may seek for it elsewhere. When once found and recognised, it is potent by its example. Hero-worship is a cult for which the average Scottish student has large capacity. And so it comes that it is not merely lecture-rooms and laboratories and libraries that are important. The places where those who are busy in the pursuit of different kinds of learning meet and observe each other are hardly less so. The union, the

debating society, the talk with the fellow-pilgrim on the steep and narrow way, the friendship of those who are struggling to maintain a high level—these things all of them go to the making of the scholar; and we in the North may congratulate ourselves that they are in reality as open to us as is the case in the Universities of England and of the Continent. If the corporate spirit of the University life is not with us made manifest by as notable signs, it is not the less there. Ideas have been as freely interchanged, and ties between scholars as readily created, with us as in other Universities. The spirit needs but little surrounding for its development, and that little it finds as readily in the solitude of the Braid Hills as on the banks of the Isis or the Cam, in the walks round Arthur's Seat as in the gardens of Magdalen or of Trinity. It rests with those immediately concerned whether their intellectual and social surroundings shall suffice them or not. Certainly in the Scottish University of to-day there is no lack of either opportunity or provision for the formation of the tastes of the scholar and the habits of the worker. A man may go from these surround-

ings to devote his life yet more completely to literature, or science, or philosophy, or he may go to seek distinction in a profession or success in commerce. Lucretius has described him who chooses the latter, and prefers the current of the world's rivalry to the scholar's life, in words which still seem to ring in my ears as I recall the figure of a great scholar—William Young Sellar—declaiming them to me and others, his reverent disciples, from the Chair of Humanity in this University many years since, in days when we were still full of youth, and were borne along on the flood tide of idealism. The Roman poet declares that the lot of the man of affairs must be :

“Errare atque viam palantis quærere vitæ,
Certare ingenio, contendere nobilitate,
Noctes atque dies niti præstante labore,
Ad summas emergere opes rerumque potiri.”

Still, it is not the spirit of haughty contempt which moved Lucretius to these burning and stinging words that should be ours. It is not enough to declare with him that the scholar finds nothing so sweet as to look down on those engaged in the battle of life, himself securely entrenched within the serene temple

of wisdom, and to watch them struggling. Rather does the University exist to furnish forth a spirit and a learning more noble—the spirit and the learning that are available for the service of the State and the salvation of humanity. The highest is also the most real; and it is at once the calling and the privilege of the teacher to convince mankind in every walk of life that in seeking the highest of its kind, they are seeking what is also the most real of that kind. Whatever occupation in life the student chooses, be it that of the study or that of the market-place, he is the better the greater has been his contact with the true spirit of the University. At the very least he will have gained much if he has learned—as he can learn from the scholar alone—the intellectual humility that is born of the knowledge that teaches us our own limits and the infinity that lies beyond. He will be the better man should he perchance have caught the significance of the words with which Plato makes Socrates conclude a famous dialogue: “If, Theætetus, you have a wish to have any more embryo thoughts, they will be all the better for the present investigation; and if

you have none, you will be soberer and humbler and gentler to other men, not fancying that you know what you do not know." For the ends of practice as for those of theoretical study, for skill in the higgling of the market, for the control of great business organisations, for that swift and almost instinctive grasp of the true point which is of the essence of success at the Bar—for these and countless other situations in everyday life the precept of Socrates is of a value which it is difficult to overrate. It is the want of insight of the narrow mind that is the most common reason why apparently well-laid plans get wrecked. The University training cannot by itself supply capacity; but it can stimulate and fashion talent, and, above all, it can redeem from the danger of contracted views. Thus the University becomes a potent instrument for good to a community, the strength of which is measured by the capacity of the individuals who compose it. The University is the handmaid of the State, of which it is the microcosm—a community in which also there are rulers and ruled, and in which the corporate life is a moulding influence.

And so we arrive at the truth, which is becoming yearly more and more clearly perceived, not here alone, but in other lands, that the State must see to the well-being and equipment of its Universities if it is to be furnished with the best quality in its citizens and in its servants. The veriest materialist cannot but be impressed when he looks around and sees the increasing part which science plays year by year in the struggle of the nations for supremacy. It is true that mere knowledge is not action; but it must not be forgotten that the transition to successful action is nowadays from knowledge, and not from ignorance. Things are in our time too difficult and complicated to be practicable without the best equipment, and this is as much true of public affairs as it is the case in private life.

And now let us pass to yet deeper-going conclusions. If it be the ideal work of the Universities to produce men of the widest minds—men who are fit to lead as well as merely to organise—what must such men set before themselves? The actual is not merely infinite any more than it is merely finite. The merely infinite were perfect, but the eye

of man could not behold it. Only in the daily striving to reach them, imperfect as that striving may seem, are life and freedom accomplished facts. The particular and the universal are not separate existences. Each is real only through the other. It is not in Nature, but as immanent in the self, finite as consciousness discloses that self to be, that we find God; and so it is that this great truth pervades every relation of life. "He who would accomplish anything must limit himself." The man who would lead others must himself be capable of renouncing. Not in some world apart, but here and now, in the duty, however humble, that lies nearest us, is the realisation of the higher self—the self that tends Godward—to be sought. And this carries with it something more. To succeed is to throw one's whole strength into work; and if the work must always and everywhere involve the passage through the portal of renunciation, be special and even contracted, then the only life that for us human beings can be perfect is the life that is *dedicated*. I mean by the expression a "dedicated life" one that is with all its strength concentrated on a high purpose.

Such a life may not seem to him who looks on only from outside to comprise every good. The purpose, though high, may be restricted. The end may never be attained. Yet the man is great, for the quality of his striving is great. "Lofty designs must close in like effects."

The first duty of life is to seek to comprehend clearly what our strength will let us accomplish, and then to do it with all our might. This may not, regarded from outside, appear to the spectator to be the greatest of possible careers, but the ideal career is the one in which we can be greatest according to the limits of our capacity. A life into which our whole strength is thrown, in which we look neither to the right nor to the left, if to do so is to lose sight of duty—such a life is a dedicated life. The forms may be manifold. The lives of all great men have been dedicated; singleness of purpose has dominated them throughout.

Thus it was with the life of a Socrates, a Spinoza, or a Newton; thus with the lives of men of action such as Cæsar and Cromwell and Napoleon. We may well see

their limits; theirs was the sphere of what is human, the finite. But they concentrated on the accomplishment of a clearly conceived purpose, and worked with their whole strength, and the greatest of them threw that strength into the striving after what was noblest. They may have perished before their end appeared accomplished in time, and yet they have succeeded. The quality of their work lay in the very striving itself. The end, a profound modern thinker tells us in a great passage, does not wait to be accomplished; it is always accomplishing itself. "In our finite human life we never realise or see that the end has in truth been reached. The completion of the infinite purpose is thus only the process of removing the illusion that it is not accomplished. The good, the absolutely good, is eternally working itself out in the world, and the result is that it is already there in its perfection, and does not need to wait for us."

The noblest of souls can find full satisfaction for his best aspirations in the sustained effort to do his duty in the work that lies at hand to the utmost that is in him. It is the function

of education in the highest sense to teach him that there are latent in him possibilities beyond what he has dreamed of, and to develop in him capacities of which, without contact with the highest learning, he had never become aware. And so the University becomes, at its best, the place where the higher ends of life are made possible of attainment, where the finite and the infinite are found to come together. The wider our outlook, the more we have assimilated the spirit of the teachers of other nations and other ages than our own, the more will the possibilities of action open to us, and the more real may become the choice of that high aim of man, the dedicated life. We learn so to avoid the unconscious devotion of our energies to that for which we are not fit, and the peril of falling unconsciously into insincerity and unreality of purpose. We learn so to choose the work that is most congenial to us, because we find in it what makes us most keenly conscious that we are bringing into actual existence the best that lies latent in us. The wider outlook, the deeper sympathy, the keener insight, which

this kind of culture gives, do not paralyse. They save him who has won them from numberless pitfalls. They may teach him his own limits, and the more he has learned his lesson the more he will realise these limits. But they do not dishearten him, for he has become familiar with the truth that the very essence of consciousness and of life is to be aware of limits and to strive to overcome them. He knows that without limits there can be no life, and that to have comprehended these limits is to have transcended them. As for what lies beyond him he has realised that it is but as the height in front, which is gained only to disclose another height beyond. He is content with his lot if, and so far as he feels that in him too, as he seeks with all his strength to bring forth the best that is in him, and at the same time to be helpful to others, God is realising Himself.

Such, to my mind, is the lesson which it were the noblest function of the ideal University to set forth, and in this fashion can such a University help to give to the world leaders of men, in thought and in action alike. The spirit which it inspires brings with it the calm

outlook which does not paralyse human energy, because it teaches that it is quality and not quantity that counts, and that the eternal lies not far away in some other world, but is present here and now. For the man who has learned in this school the common picture of the future life becomes an image that has been raised to correct the supposed inadequate and contingent character of this one; and, as his insight into the deeper meaning of reality in this world grows, so he realises that his true immortality begins on this side of the grave. To feel himself infinite in his finitude, to learn to accept his closely-bounded life and task as the process in which the side of him that is touched by infinity becomes real, to be aware of the immanence of the Divine in the humblest and saddest consciousness—this is the lesson which each of us may learn, the secret which the teaching of a true University may unlock for us; the teaching of a University, but not in the commonplace and restricted sense. In such a school we are instructed in the theoretical meaning of life as we can hardly be elsewhere. But this is not the only discipline by which

we obtain deliverance from the burden of our ignorance, and are led to dedicate ourselves to noble ends. There is a lesson which ought never to be overlooked, and that is the necessity of suppressing the will to live. Before we can command we must learn to obey, and this also a true University life has to teach.

There is innate in the great mass of men and women instinct of obedience to the nature that is higher than their own. In the days in which we live mere rank does not awaken this instinct; in the Anglo-Saxon race the belief in the Divine right of kings has passed away. But even in this forgotten faith we have the spectacle of something that was symbolical of a deeper truth.

Belief in God and submission to His will is the foundation of religion. Belief in the State as real equally with the individual citizens in whom it is realised and whom it controls, this is the foundation of orderly government. It is not a king as individual, it is a king as the symbol of what is highest in national life that to-day commands loyalty. The instinct of obedience

shows itself here, but its real foundation resembles the foundation of that other obedience which is made manifest in the religious life. It is the tendency to bow before the truth, to recognise the rational as the real and the real as the rational. In the main, what is highest will assert its authority with the majority of mankind, and assert it in the end successfully.

What is necessary, and what alone is necessary, is that what is highest should be made manifest, and that for this purpose the mists of ignorance should be dispelled. The more the leader embodies the quality that is great, the wider and more complete will be his ultimate sway. Time may be required, the time that gives birth to opportunity, but the truth will prevail. History, and the history of religion in particular, furnishes us with an unbroken succession of witnesses to this conclusion. A leader may apparently fail, his doctrine may be superseded. But if in his period he has represented the best teaching which the Time Spirit could bring forth, his appeal has never been in vain. His victory may not have been complete until

after his death. He himself may have been narrow and even fanatical. He may have given utterance to what seems to us, looking back with a larger outlook, to have been but a partial and inadequate expression of the truth. But the history of knowledge is no record of system cast aside and obliterated by what has succeeded it. Rather is the truth a process of development in which each partial view is gradually corrected by and finally absorbed into what comes after it. There may be, as elements in the process, violent revulsions—revulsions to what proves itself in the end to be as one-sided as that which it has superseded. But, taken over a sufficient tract of time, the process of knowledge in the main displays itself as one in which the truth has turned out to be a larger and deeper comprehension of what for the generation before was the best of which that generation was capable. Thus there is at all times a tendency for a new phase of authority to display itself—the authority which rests either on reason or on the instinct that the highest is to be sought beyond what belongs merely to the moment. And the striving in which this tendency in the

end takes shape appears in just a deeper meaning conferred on what is here and now. Sometimes even to a nation the revelation comes suddenly. It wakens from its dogmatic slumber, is wakened perhaps by the sense of impending calamity, and proves at a bound what is the measure of its latent capacity.

So it was with England under Cromwell, with France under Napoleon, with the United States under Washington, with Germany under the great leaders of the intellectual awakening of the nineteenth century. So it has been with Japan, the spectacle of whose new and rapid development has just been unrolled before the eyes of this generation. The awakening has come suddenly in such cases, and that awakening of thought and action has been in response to the Higher Command :

“There are flashes struck from midnights,
There are fire-flames noondays kindle,
Whereby piled-up honours perish,
Whereby swollen ambitions dwindle,
While just this or that poor impulse
Which for once had played unstified,
Seems the sole work of a lifetime,
That away the rest have trifled.”

In peace as in war, history displays the irresistible nature of this Higher Command where it really has made itself manifest. He who wields it may be humble. If the divine fire of genius has inspired him, no barrier can hold him from the highest recognition—that recognition which is founded on the popular conviction that, at last, in this particular sphere of thought or of action, the truth has been made evident.

Sometimes—perhaps more often than not—this Command is wielded, too, by no single man. It may take the form of a great doctrine—the foundation of a penetrating faith, inculcated and enforced by a group of leaders in co-operation, no one of whom would have been great enough to be the head of a nation. This was so with Germany at the commencement of the last century, and it would seem to have been so in the recent instance of Japan. The lesson is that, given an inspiring faith, moral or intellectual, and a sufficiency of men imbued with it and fit to teach and to preach it, no nation need languish for want of a single great leader. The Higher Command is there all the same; it is only differently expressed

and made manifest. Here, then, it has for long seemed to me, lies the true and twofold function of the University. It is a place of research, where the new and necessary knowledge is to be developed. It is a place of training, where the exponents of that knowledge—the men who are to seek authority based on it—are to be nurtured and receive their spiritual baptism.

Such a University cannot be dependent in its spirit. It cannot live and thrive under the domination either of the Government or the Church. Freedom and development are the breath of its nostrils, and it can recognise no authority except that which rests on the right of the Truth to command obedience. Religion, art, science—these are, for the body of teachers of the true University type, but special and therefore restricted avenues towards that Truth—many-sided as it is, and never standing still. It was Lessing who declared that were God to offer him the Truth in one hand and the Search for Truth in the other, he would choose the Search. He meant that, just as the Truth never stands still, but is in its nature a process of evolution, so the mind

of the seeker after it can never stand still. Only in the process of daily conquering them anew do we, in this region also, gain life and freedom. And it is in the devotion to this search after the Most High—a search which may assume an infinity of varied forms—that the dedicated life consists; the life dedicated to the noblest of quests, and not to be judged by apparent failure to reach some fixed and rigid goal, but rather by the quality of its striving.

I know no career more noble than that of a life so consecrated. We have each of us to ask ourselves at the outset a great question. We have to ascertain of what we are really capable. For if we essay what it is not given to us to excel in, the quality of our striving will be deficient. But, given the capacity to recognise and seek after what is really the highest in a particular department of life, then it is not the attainment of some external goal—itsself of limited and transient importance—but in earnestness and concentration of effort to accomplish what all recognise to be a noble purpose, that the measure of success lies. So it was with Browning's *Grammarian*. Men

laughed at him while he lived. That did not matter. In the end they bowed their heads before him, and when his life was finished laid him to rest in the highest place they knew. For they saw the greatness of spirit of the man who chose what he could best accomplish, limited himself to that, and strove to perfect his work with all his might.

If its Universities produce this spirit in its young men and women, a nation need not despair. The way is steep and hard to tread for those who enter on it. They must lay aside much of what is present and commonly sought after. They must regard themselves as deliberately accepting the duty of preferring the higher to the lower at every turn of daily existence. So only can they make themselves accepted leaders; so only can they aspire to form a part of that priesthood of humanity to whose commands the world will yield obedience.

There is a saying of Jesus with which I will conclude this address, because it seems to me to be, in its deepest interpretation, of profound significance for us, whose concern is for the

spirit of this University and for its future influence : “Not every one that saith unto me, Lord, Lord, shall enter into the kingdom of heaven; but he that doeth the will of My Father which is in heaven.”

GREAT BRITAIN AND GERMANY

A STUDY IN NATIONAL CHARACTERISTICS

An Address delivered at Oxford on 3rd August 1911.

GREAT BRITAIN AND GERMANY

A STUDY IN NATIONAL CHARACTERISTICS

IT was not without hesitation that I accepted the invitation to speak to you on this occasion. It is never easy to make a satisfactory appreciation of a country to which one stands in the relation of a foreigner. Those who try are sure to misjudge much and to miss more. Germany, moreover, is for us Britons, owing to reasons which I shall try to explain, a specially difficult country to understand. Its people possess traits so like those of our own, that we are apt to overlook those other traits in which they are profoundly unlike. Hence arise misinterpretations and disappointments on both sides of the German Ocean.

Nevertheless a period in history has arrived when it becomes the duty of public men in each country to endeavour to follow and

fathom the currents of public life and opinion in the other. To this end the study of national spirit is essential. How often have I seen in the newspapers of both Germany and England articles which missed the point and attributed unreal motives, simply because the writers were wanting in knowledge! And what is true of journalists may be true even of statesmen.

In Oxford people at times dare to use language which they would not venture on in Parliament. Moreover, some of you who are listening are Germans and professors besides. I will therefore take my life in my hand, and suggest to you a racial difference in habit of mind, to be stated thus:—The Englishman acts *der Vorstellung nach*; the German *dem Begriffe nach*. The Englishman has, less often than the German, formed in his mind an abstract principle or plan before he moves. This is so partly by habit and partly by choice. It is the outcome of his characteristic individualism, and experience has taught him that it often proves a source of strength. But it not infrequently proves a source of weakness. He constantly finds the path he has entered on

blocked by obstacles which he might have foreseen. *Erst wägen dann wagen* is a maxim too valuable in practice to be safely neglected. It may sometimes paralyse action in this world of the contingent and unforeseen. But those who practise it know where they stand, if they do not always know where to move.

Of course people who by habit of mind act in these different fashions are sure to misunderstand each other. The effort that is requisite; even when they most wish to put themselves at the other point of view, is for the great majority too severe to be long sustained. The divergence in mental temperament is embarrassing in itself. And it is made yet more embarrassing by another fact. We in this country, and I am not sure that the same is not true of our German cousins, are a little unimaginative about our neighbours. Our *paedagogischer Zug* is sometimes provoking. The lesson which Matthew Arnold sought to teach his fellow citizens here when he published *Friendship's Garland* forty years ago has not yet been widely learned. We used to have friction on this account with the French, and, but for circumstances, we might have it still.

We do sometimes have it with the Germans, because the circumstances happen to be not quite so favourable. It is therefore all the more desirable that we should take pains to get insight into the habits of thought of a great and practical nation with which we are being brought into an ever-increasing contact, and in what I have to say to you to-night I will try to contribute something, however small, to the too contracted fund of the necessary knowledge. I propose to devote the bulk of this paper to an attempt to trace the growth and meaning of what seems to me to be the German habit of mind, and to a description of the reasons why the outlook of Germany is what it is to-day. The narrative is not only a deeply interesting one, but is a record which confers a title to high distinction in the world's history, even for a nation so great in other respects. It is, moreover, a narrative not the less striking, because the changes it records all took place within a comparatively short period.

The practical life of the Germany of to-day rests, far more than does that of Great Britain, on abstract and theoretical foundations. To

understand it we must examine its intellectual development, and, for the history of the intellectual development of German life, the Reformation is a cardinal fact. Luther led the uprising of the spirit of liberty of conscience against the then abstract and hardly human domination of the Church. He accomplished, for a large part of what is to-day Germany, the triumph of the individual over an organisation which had for the time being outgrown its mission and deteriorated into what was mechanical. But the price of Luther's victory had to be paid. You cannot set thought free for certain purposes only. The light of inquiry presently began to be turned in upon the foundations of Luther's own faith. That faith rested on grounds of a subjective character, and its authority was based on feeling. Now the history of the intellectual development of the world shows that it has never been safe to endeavour to divorce feeling from knowledge. The effort is constantly being renewed, and to-day even M. Bergson, the latest and most brilliant exponent of the attempt to assign a secondary place to knowledge, and to bring back the real

to the felt, seems to me to invite the inquirer to travel along a dubious path. To try to accomplish what he, by the way, is careful not to attempt, the discovery of a safe and permanent foundation for faith in what is wholly divorced from reason, is, from a scientific point of view, to court speedy failure. This opinion has always been strongly held in Germany, and it was slowly but surely brought to bear on the Protestantism of Luther. That Protestantism gradually acquired, in the minds of educated men, a negative character. It was recognised as a legitimate and necessary protest against the doctrine of the absolute authority of a Church. But it was also pronounced to be the beginning only and not the end of wisdom. The history of Protestantism, and of the sects into which it has broken itself up, show that it is not enough to reject the doctrine of external authority, but that the authority of a general system based on knowledge, however difficult it may be to find such a system, has to be sought for. When the elector managed, in 1529, to bring together in the conference at Marburg Luther and Zwingli, believing that the German and Swiss

parties in the Reformation movement would unite their forces, he proved to be wrong. They got very near each other in the course of the conference, so far as good feeling went, and sufficiently near in words. But there was no real common basis. The historian tells us how, at the end, Luther drew back, and refused to shake hands with the Swiss leader —“Ye are,” he said, “of a different spirit from us.”

It was therefore natural that, with a reflective people like the Germans, a definite movement should follow that of the Reformation, a movement directed to the discovery of a stable basis on which religion might rest, a basis which should afford room for science and religion alike. The sense of this necessity became, on its subjective side, apparent in such writings as Lessing's *Nathan the Wise*. On the side of abstract knowledge we see it begin in the metaphysics of the pre-Kantian period, of the period of such writers as Wolf, and in the theological Rationalism, which was its counterpart, of such books as the *Wolfenbüttel Fragments*. But the mere reaction from the subjective, on which alone

Luther had endeavoured to base the claim to authority of the Bible, went too far to be enduring. The eighteenth century was a dry period for Germany until a second great movement arose. One of the acutest of modern critics, a critic whose capricious humour obscured his serious side, has traced the relation of the Reformation to this movement. Heine, who knew more about great things than people give him credit for, sums up the progress in this period. Of Luther he tells us that through him Germany gained freedom of thought. But he adds that Luther gave Germany not only freedom of thought, but also the means of movement. To the spirit he gave a body, to the thought he gave words; he created the German language by his translation of the Bible. And even more remarkable, he says, were Luther's songs. Sometimes they resemble a flower that grows on a rocky crag, or again a ray of moonlight trembling over a restless sea. And sometimes he sings to stimulate the courage of his followers, and inflame himself to the fierce rage of battle. He refers, no doubt, to the well-known "Ein' feste Burg ist unser Gott," when he says that

a true battle song was the martial strain with which Luther and his followers marched into Worms. The old cathedral trembled at those unwonted tones, and the ravens, in their dark nests in the steeple, started with affright. That song, the Marseillaise of the Reformation, preserves to this day its inspiriting power. But, as Heine tells us, the spirit that Luther unchained could not have limits set to its power. Reason is now man's sole lamp, and conscience his only staff in the dark mazes of life. Man now stands alone, face to face with his Creator, and chants his songs to Him. Hence this literary epoch opens with hymns. And even later, when it becomes secular, the most intimate self-consciousness, the feeling of personality, rules throughout. Poetry is no longer objective, epic, and naïve, but subjective, lyric, and reflective. At this stage Heine brings a new figure on to the scene. Since Luther, he thinks, Germany has produced no greater and better man than Gotthold Ephraim Lessing. "These two are our pride and our joy. In the troubles of the present we look back at their consoling figures, and they answer with a look full of bright promise.

The third man will come also, will perfect what Luther began and what Lessing carried on—the third Liberator.” Like Luther, Lessing’s achievements consisted not only in effecting something definite, but in agitating the German people to its depths, and in awakening through his criticism and polemics a wholesome intellectual activity. He was the vivifying critic of his time, and his whole life was a polemic. His insight made itself felt throughout the widest range of thought and feeling—in religion, in science, and in art. Lessing, declares Heine, continued the work of Luther. After Luther had freed Germany from the yoke of tradition and had exalted the Bible as the only wellspring of Christianity, there ensued a rigid word service, and the letter of the Bible ruled just as tyrannically as once did tradition. Lessing contributed the most to the emancipation from the tyranny of the letter. His tribune was art, for when he was excluded from the pulpit or the chair he sprang on to the stage, speaking out more boldly, and gaining a more numerous audience.

In the year of his death, 1781, there appeared a book from the pen of a still more

profound revolutionary. In that year Kant published at Königsberg the *Critique of Pure Reason*. Heine likens the intellectual revolution which this book produced to the material revolution in France, and he compares, in his own fashion, Kant to Robespierre. "On both sides of the Rhine we behold the same rupture with the past; it is loudly proclaimed that all reverence for tradition is at an end. As in France no privilege, so in Germany no thought is tolerated without proving its right to exist; nothing is taken for granted. And as in France fell the Monarchy, the keystone of the old social system, so in Germany fell theism, the keystone of the intellectual *ancien régime*. It is said that the spirits of darkness tremble with affright when they behold the sword of an executioner. How, then, must they stand aghast when confronted with Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason*! The book is the sword with which in Germany theism was decapitated. To be candid, you French are tame and moderate compared with us Germans. At most you have slain a king, and he had already lost his head before he was beheaded."

Then Heine draws a picture of Kant, with his bourgeois and methodical habits, and speaks of the strange contrast between the outer life of the man and his destructive, world-convulsing thoughts. Had the citizens of Königsberg surmised the whole significance of these thoughts, they would have felt a more profound awe in the presence of this man than in that of an executioner. But the good people saw in him nothing but a professor of philosophy. "Nature," concludes Heine, "had intended both Robespierre and Kant to weigh out sugar and coffee; but fate willed it otherwise, and into the scales of one it laid a king, into those of the other a god. And they both weighed correctly."

The view of Kant's teaching which Heine suggests is of course deficient. Kant was constructive as well as critical, and he laid the foundations of a far greater conception of God than any that he destroyed. The figure of Immanuel Kant indeed is one of the noblest in the history of spiritual life on its moral as well as on its intellectual side. His philosophy was far-reaching, alike in practice and in theory. For he completely

divided the universe into two aspects, that of the world of actual experience, where necessity reigned and science held its sway, and the other aspect of the moral world, where the cardinal principle was that of complete freedom and complete responsibility. "Thou canst because thou oughtst." Between science and religion there could be no conflict, for each had its own sphere, and the two spheres were absolutely and scientifically marked off by a boundary line which could not really be crossed. But in the hands of Kant this distinction was to break down, and in the third of his Critiques—that of Judgment—he was driven to admit that, confronted by even that aspect of things with which experience through the senses furnishes us, we find ourselves driven beyond the categories of mechanism to the qualification of causes by ends, and perhaps even by the supreme and ultimate fact of self-consciousness. Yet, although this somewhat grudging admission was to be seized on by his successors, the value of his achievement in the Critical Philosophy was not thereby diminished. He had succeeded in raising the entire level—in

bringing life into what had been a collection of dry bones. He had restored the worlds of moral obligation and of beauty to their positions as real, though real in a different way from the world of mechanism. He had made for religion a place—within somewhat narrow limits of pure reason it is true—but still a place where it could find a firm foundation and base a claim to authority which science could not shake. And by doing all this he had made possible a further great work, that of the poets and the idealists who were to dominate German thought for the first half of the nineteenth century, and to exercise a profound influence beyond the confines of Germany.

In the hands of Fichte, Schelling, and finally of Hegel, the Kantian philosophy was profoundly transformed. A more widely embracing meaning was given to self-consciousness. Within its closed circle the entire universe was brought as under a supreme and final conception, and brought as a connected whole. Thought and feeling were no longer separated as though independent existences, but were displayed as

partial aspects of a single movement of mind. The categories of intelligence were extended in their scope and given an organic relation, co-extensive with the entire content of self-consciousness, in which they found their meaning and completion. The object world was looked on as real in the same sense as the subject world, and both as arising by distinction within self-consciousness itself. God was regarded as immanent, as a spirit to be worshipped in spirit and in truth, and not as an unknowable First Cause. Science, morality, art, religion, were all assigned to their parts in the movement of divine and infinite self-consciousness, which was ever realising itself in finite forms such as that of the individual man. Yet that divine and infinite self-consciousness was shown to imply for its realisation the form of the finite, just as, on its part, the finite had its foundation and reality in God and God alone. Because the higher categories of self-consciousness, outside of which there was no meaning, even for God himself, were above those of the mechanism of which they were at once the completion as well as the presupposition,

no question of freedom arose. For the ultimate reality was spiritual, and it is of the essence of spirit to be free.

Such was the movement of the early part of the nineteenth century on its philosophical side. It was carried no doubt to great lengths and excesses. But it was destined to influence history profoundly, and, as a first step, a great practical proof of the reality of its foundations appeared almost at once in the world of art. The spirit of idealism was presently found to be one which had extended beyond the philosophers. Goethe and Schiller practised and taught in another shape the same great principles. They too passed beyond Kant, and passed in the same direction as his successors in the schools of philosophy. Now that direction was not, as is often erroneously said, from the living and concrete to the abstract and lifeless. It has frequently been made a reproach, not only against German philosophy, but against Goethe himself, that the highest and most abiding element in human activity, the spiritual and living, was ignored in the teaching of this time. To-day the reproach has been brought forward, as

regards German idealism generally, in a definite form ; and before an audience such as this the reproach ought not to be passed by in silence. The late Professor James of Harvard and M. Bergson, already referred to, one of the most distinguished of living philosophers, have elaborated it. In two of his books, *Les données immédiates de la Conscience* and *L'Evolution Creatrice*, M. Bergson has drawn a sharp distinction between knowledge, which he declares to be always abstract and confined to representation of what are really spatial relations, and the direct consciousness of creative evolution in a real time. To the latter he refers us for the "*elan*," which is the true explanation of the development both of the living world and of conscious mind itself. Bergson's doctrine has been laid hold of as something wholly new, and as putting investigation on a quite fresh track. And his doctrine is stated not only in a new form, but with a wealth of scientific knowledge and a lucidity of expression which justify for it a claim to genuine originality. Yet the doctrine of an inherent impulse, such as this great French thinker seeks to establish, is in itself

no new one. German idealism itself at one time laid great emphasis on it. Schopenhauer has left no school to carry on his teaching, and his books are to-day much less in evidence than they once were. But he, too, found in knowledge but a derivative phenomenon of a deeper-lying *nisus*, which underlay the nature of things and constituted their ultimate reality. Unlike Bergson, he considered Time to be merely a subjective form. In agreement with Bergson, he regarded abstract Space as being little more. But for him, also, the ultimately real, that into which all else can be resolved, while it is itself incapable of being resolved at all, was not knowledge. Like Kant, whose true successor he claimed to be, he declined to recognise the domain of knowledge as absolute, but he went further and resolved it into something deeper than itself. This he called "WILL"; and yet in the end he was able to tell us of its nature, of the *nisus* or striving of Will, no more than Bergson has been able to tell us of his "creative impulse." It is the less curious that German idealism should have assigned, in the minds of certain of its disciples, a subordinate reality to know-

ledge, when we reflect that not only had Kant suggested an awareness of a raw material of sensation as an irreducible element in cognition, but that Schelling and his school had, later on, found the key to the discovery of the nature of ultimate reality, not in knowledge, but in what Schelling called "Intellectual Intuition," and in the somewhat obscure notion of an Absolute which Hegel was presently to deride as "the night in which all cows look black."

It has been said with truth that wherever there arises a great movement such as that of German idealism, it is in danger, if its preachers do not watch closely, of degenerating into an abstract intellectualism, a tendency to reduce the being of the universe to what has been called "a ballet of bloodless categories." The strength of such intellectualism is that it insists resolutely, as against such critics as Schelling and Schopenhauer and M. Bergson alike, that words are useless unless an exact meaning can be attached to them, and that such a meaning can be assigned only in terms of knowledge. *Esse* becomes in the end co-extensive with *intelligi*. But, on the other

hand, the weakness of such idealism is that in the treatment of it by any but the greatest writers it tends to get out of hand. Apparently it need not do so. In its highest forms German idealism did not separate thought from feeling as if they were separate existences. On the contrary, they were for it only correlative aspects of one single reality, the actual and living content of self-consciousness. In no form of self-conscious activity was identity to be found except in and through difference. Thought is no mere faculty of abstract identification. Hegel himself adopted the supposed Aristotelian maxim—*Nihil est in intellectu quod non fuerit in sensu*. “The contents of our consciousness,” he says, “remain one and the same, whether they are felt, seen, represented, or willed, and whether they are merely felt, or felt with an admixture of thoughts, or merely and simply thought.” We thus reach a conclusion which will prove to be of importance for the general purpose of this address. The true tendency of the idealism of Germany in the early part of the nineteenth century was in the direction of regarding the real as concrete and living, and

as immediate for consciousness just as much as mediated in reflection. It is therefore not surprising that, to begin with, in the great poets of the period we find this characteristic markedly prominent. Schopenhauer, over whom Goethe had exercised much influence, recognised it. Both he and Hegel agreed with Goethe's great doctrine:—

“Natur hat weder Kern noch Schale,
Alles ist sie mit einem Male.”

With Goethe this was no empty saying. In his scientific work and his poetry alike he never failed to insist on it. Nature was for him something living, and reality was this living process. The notion of creative evolution, to use M. Bergson's phrase, was the key to his researches into the metamorphoses of plants and to his general ideas of morphology. The conception of a rigid mechanical universe was abhorrent to him. When he wishes Mephistopheles to mock at the student, he makes him say:—

“Wer will was lebendig's erkennen und beschreiben,
Sucht erst den Geist heraus zu treiben,

Dann hat er die Theile in seiner Hand,
 Fehlt leider nur das geistige Band,
 Encheiresin Naturae nennt's die Chemie,
 Spottet ihrer selbst und weiss nicht wie."

It is the same throughout. Life was for Goethe the grand feature of the objective universe, and observation and not abstract scientific classification was the way to come at it. That is one reason why he excelled in lyric verse. In his lyrics he hardly ever writes a line that does not embody the sense of life. His maxim for mankind he puts in his "Faust" into the lips of the Deity when he makes him, in the prologue, apostrophise men thus:—

"Doch ihr, die echten Göttersöhne,
 Erfreut euch der lebendig reichen Schöne.
 Das werdende, das ewig wirkt und lebt,
 Umfass euch mit der Liebe holden Schranken,
 Und was in schwankender Erscheinung schwebt,
 Befestiget mit daurenden Gedanken."

To me these words seem to be not only profoundly characteristic of the idealistic thought of Germany at the highest point it touched. We shall see presently how the principle was to be applied in the practical life of the State.

I am aware that, as regards the philosophical development, what I have expressed is not the common opinion. But reflection on what the great German idealists wrote has made me think that this is the true view, and I refer to it here because it bears on what comes after. There is no incompatibility between the passion for concrete and living reality, and the passion for exhibiting it in a system. Goethe himself had a thoroughly systematic mind, and, as some of you at Oxford have pointed out, Hegel was behind no philosopher, ancient or modern, in his resolute refusal to separate thought from things, the abstract from the concrete, the continuous from the discrete, and being from becoming.

System then, system necessarily in its first aspect abstract, but system that has its beginning and end in concrete life, this was the intellectual inheritance of the German nation from the philosophers and poets of the early nineteenth century. Someone once said, "Without Goethe, no Bismarck." It seems to me that this saying is true. But its author might have added that without the great German thinkers there would also have been

no Scharnhorst, no Clausewitz, no Roon, and no Moltke. There is hardly anything in the history of modern Germany that illustrates more thoroughly what has been called "the wonderful might of thought," than the capacity it has developed for organisation. An especially fine illustration is the organisation of the German military system. It began after the battle of Jena. Prior to that catastrophe German generals had ceased to think. They had been content to adhere blindly to the traditions they had inherited from Frederick the Great. But these traditions belonged to a system which was of the past, and was bound up with the personality of an almost unique leader—one who could do almost what he liked with his army, and who had fashioned his strategy and his tactics and his staff, not for all time, but to deal with the special problem of his period, the problem which he had in his day to solve.

In the pages of Von Treitschke's *Bilder*, and especially in the chapter called "*Der Anfang des Befreiungskrieges*," the story is told of how the change came about. Von Treitschke was a great writer of history. He

describes with a vividness which recalls Macaulay to the English student. He is never more in his element than when he is depicting the uprising against Napoleon in 1813. He tells us first of all of the inspiration of Prussia by her statesmen, her soldiers, her thinkers, and her poets. He draws the picture of a nation penetrated by enthusiasm and determination in every rank and every phase of life. He describes how the national energy was directed and organised by great military leaders like Scharnhorst and Blucher. And then he tells how a great army was rapidly created, apparently by the people themselves, with a single purpose, that of delivering Prussia from the yoke of the oppressor. The narrative never flags, the historian remains at his high level throughout. Napoleon is in the end driven out of Germany; then peace follows. For the rest we do not need to turn to the pages of any particular author. The inspiration of the spirit of victory passed into a series of diverse writers. Clausewitz shows us to what a high point of literary as well as scientific excellence a great military critic can attain. The idealist

commentators on the history of the State show the profound effect which a successful effort at self-deliverance can exercise over even the most abstract of philosophers. Everywhere German thought at this period discloses the surroundings of the thinkers, and the reality of the conception of the State which was prevalent. The individual finds his best and highest life as a citizen in the nation to which he belongs. We have travelled far from the comparatively recent teaching of Kant. The general will has become much more prominent than the individual will, and government has revealed itself as the dominant fact.

This state of mind could not last, but it is a tribute to German tenacity in holding to conceptions that it was to change as little as it did. There came next a period in which the abstract views of the school of the Left prevailed over the school of the Right wing. It is not easy to realise that in founding a revolutionary movement Marx and Lasalle believed themselves to be carrying the torch which Hegel had kindled. But they did believe it. The new *Aufklärung* held the field

for a considerable time. Germany gradually turned from idealism to science, and in a less but still marked degree to socialism. Her literature became insignificant and her philosophy lost its hold. But in science she became stronger than ever, and in the faculty of business organisation strongest of all. This was natural. Nothing so recalls a people to serious practical purposes as war does, with the havoc which it plays with individual life, and Prussia had a succession of wars. They culminated in 1870, and Bismarck then was free to turn his attention to industrial and social organisation. Whatever criticism may be passed on the policy Germany thought out and adopted, at least it was a policy which had been carefully considered. Since the days of Friedrich List the avowed purpose of the prevailing school of economists in Germany had been to subordinate economic to national considerations, and above all to the end of German unification. This was the line which Bismarck in the main consistently pursued. For this purpose he introduced into the life of the people organisation wherever he could. In education, in military training, in her poor-

law, Germany began to stand out more and more among the nations. Naturally a process so far-reaching as that which Bismarck developed was sure to be attended by its Nemesis in the shape of reaction. And reaction came. The social democrats on the one hand, writers like Nietzsche on the other, and the modern spirit, in the shape of a freely expressed criticism of the German school system for the narrowness of the type it produced, were inevitable. To glance in passing at the illustration which German education affords, it is odd to reflect that Eton and Harrow, institutions which many people here do not regard as free from grave defects, have become much thought of in educational circles in Germany. And why? Not for the learning they impart, but because in these and other great public schools in England the real rulers are seen to be the boys themselves, and the tendency is to produce individuality and the qualities which go to the making of leaders of men.

In these as in other matters it is only by estimating things on balance that reliable conclusions can be reached. The German

system of education has many advantages and certain disadvantages. These last can be mitigated if something of the English Public School spirit can be introduced into Germany, without sacrificing the enormous advantage she has over us in the organisation in other respects of her secondary schools. It is the same with many other institutions. It is not an unmixed good to a country to be over-governed, and Germany is still probably too much governed, for that free development of individuality which is characteristic of life here and in the United States. But this must not be taken to mean that the order which prevails in so many departments of German social life is not a great advantage to her, and one which ought, as far as possible, to be preserved if she ever, in her constitutional development, approximates more nearly to our models. In many ways we ourselves are rapidly adopting, with the modifications that the national habit of mind makes inevitable, German examples. I do not mean only in such fields as that of National Insurance, although that is not a bad illustration, but in other directions. I am at present much occupied as Chairman of a Royal

Commission that is sitting on University Education in London, and I am much struck by the growing influence of German University methods that is apparent in the evidence of the numerous expert witnesses we have examined. In this direction and in technical education the Teutonic spirit is moving among us, but moving in a fashion that is on the whole our own. And, on the other hand, Germany herself is learning something from us. She is studying our methods of colonial development and applying them. And she is watching, what is a characteristic feature of our national life, our vigorous local government. Moreover, she is herself altering in her habits of thought and feeling. The period of materialism and of reaction from idealism seems to be passing. The negative influence of Schopenhauer and Nietzsche seems to be spending itself. Nothing very definite has yet emerged in the form of a prevailing characteristic. But it is well to note that there are indications in many directions of a revival of the influence of the outlook on life of Goethe and the great idealists.

Two years ago a book appeared in Germany which contained several things which im-

pressed me a good deal. It was a reprint of five addresses delivered by one of the best known of modern historians of philosophy and literature—Professor Windelband of Heidelberg. In this work, which he published under the title of *Die Philosophie im Deutschen Geistesleben des XIX. Jahrhunderts*, Professor Windelband traces the course of German thought, in the poets as well as the metaphysicians and moralists, through the century that is just over. He shows how the creed of Romanticism had its form profoundly modified by the growth of a demand for a practical application to life. "*Die Forderung der Tat*," he says, became "*Wirklich der Weisheit letzter Schluss, zu dem sich die Philosophie wie die Dichtung bekannte*." He points out that, just as Schleiermacher tried to give religion a practical significance for the lives and deeds of educated people, so Hegel summoned them from their dreams to realise themselves in the performance of their duties to the State. This fruitful period was succeeded by one of materialism and pessimism, which again, under Positivist habits of mind, gave way to the standpoint of science, and

especially of psychology. The larger significance of the historical method was forgotten. "Just at the moment," says the Professor, "when we Germans had begun to make history, we ceased to wish to know anything of history." The powerful personality of a man of genius, Bismarck, had created the German Empire; his call for the exercise of a national will found a response in all directions, and the impulse to volition rather than speculation, to action and creation became dominant. "*Wir wissen zu viel, wir wollen zu wenig. Aus dem Lernvolk soll ein Tatvolk werden;*" so people began to declare all round.

But at this stage Windelband points out that a new tendency made itself felt. Democracy seemed to begin to move with giant strides. The masses realised that for the attainment of practical results knowledge was power—and the schoolmaster a veritable leveller-up. The workmen demanded participation in what had been the privilege of leadership of the classes. Social problems became increasingly attractive, and there was apparent a tendency to regard it as possible to look on all men as alike who had attained to a certain standard of learning.

This tendency, he says, produced an almost immediate reaction. The fear arose that the unique value and quality of personality might be overlooked, and even lost to the nation. Personality in thought, in art, in action, had been the main source of the strength of the German nation, and now it seemed that a movement was on foot to reduce individuality to a dead level on the demand of the masses. He tells us how the protest against this demand assumed its first form in art, and how the strongest expression of the struggle of individuality to free itself from the crushing and levelling power of the masses, came from Nietzsche. This, he says, was the secret of the hold which Nietzsche got over great numbers of his countrymen. But Nietzsche's was a too brutal insistence on the right of the "overman" to dominate. It was an *Umwertung aller Werte*. It confused the national ideas of value and moral worth, and it could not last. A yet more modern tendency has, declares the Professor, set in in Germany. The demand has been made that philosophy shall show the way to a better and more real appreciation of moral values of a permanent kind, the kind

that has, amid the changing interests of the period, an abiding foundation in a higher spiritual reality. The rule of the masses has increased, and is increasing so far as the things of outward life are concerned. What is needed is a strong and heightened personal life that can win back and preserve its own spiritual inwardness. Thus there is apparent in Germany a new tendency to return to the great systems of idealism which have proclaimed the spiritual foundation of all reality. It is not with the transitory forms of the old effort at logical construction that educated opinion is concerning itself. The abstract formulas of the old metaphysic no longer interest the general student. But he has begun to realise once more the splendid and convincing power with which the great German thinkers disentangled from a mass of historical material the permanent basis of moral and intellectual values, and brought to the general consciousness a significance in these values that is beyond the level of what is transitory or merely utilitarian. The relation of the self-conscious and self-developing individual to the community is the new problem, and the

great question is how the infinite value of the individual inner life, and the claims of the society of which the individual is a member and on which he is dependent, are to be reconciled. This is the task which modern Germany has set to philosophy and art, and on the solution they offer will depend the question whether they are considered worthy of their mission.

Such is the view of modern Germany set before us by Professor Windelband as lately as two years ago. With us in Great Britain the state of things is not quite the same. Democracy is no doubt advancing, and with even greater strides than across the German Ocean. But although there is a growing demand for education, there is, I think, a greater disposition here among the masses to regard the man who already possesses it as in a class apart. It is a possession less familiar to our people. They have never been led by fighting philosophers such as were Marx and Lassalle. The professors of political economy do not come on the side of the movement towards Socialism as freely as is the case in Germany. Nor, on the other hand, is the cry

against socialistic legislation a battle-cry of our political strife to anything like the same extent. And yet the two democracies have, in vital points, such as the desire that the State should insist on better conditions of life for those who work with their hands, much in common. It is one of the most reliable foundations for the hope of better and more intimate relations between the two countries in the days to come that this should be so. The German democracy would doubtless follow its rulers to war, as would in all probability the democracy here. But both democracies are more and more influencing the policy of these rulers, as the German Chancellor pointed out in a speech made not long ago ; and neither democracy regards war in any other light than that of a calamity. A marked and growing interest in pressing forward the demand for the solution of social problems is a guarantee of peace. The more intimate the knowledge of each other's affairs becomes in the case of the two nations, the better for everybody. But the process cannot be a very rapid one. The difference of temperament is partly racial and partly due to other reasons.

I have tried in what I have written above to disentangle the genesis and growth of some differences of mental habit and tradition which make it difficult for Englishmen and Germans fully to understand each other. If my analysis is even approximately right, there is room for the citizens of both countries to become less keenly conscious than at present of each other's infirmities. In the great mission of civilising the world, in its commercial and industrial development, in the production and exchange of goods, in science, in literature, in art, the two nations have many opportunities and aptitudes in common. Theirs is a mission and a duty in the discharge of which rivalry might well be stingless. It were a thousand pities if peaceful co-operation in work so manifold and so great, and so much in the interest of the world as a whole, were marred or even impeded by unnecessary suspicions. And yet the marring and the hindering are often to be witnessed. They arise mainly from what is the source of most of the evils of life, ignorance and want of forbearance. Given fuller knowledge, and that capacity for self-restraint should quickly and surely

operate, which, among educated races, generally checks the tendencies to diverge coming from difference of temperament. Still even this capacity cannot always be reckoned on. There are many Englishmen and Germans who have knowledge, and who practise this self-restraint. But there are still more, even among the highly educated classes, who in varying degrees fail to do so. I have seen a good many illustrations of mischief arising from the want of the practice. Some of those that were least important in themselves have left with me the most vivid impressions. I have witnessed in business relations the shortcoming in this respect of able men of both countries. I used to see it in the days when I was at the Bar, and I now sometimes see the same shortcoming illustrated in public affairs. I have noticed cases in which Germans have misjudged the meaning of British policy. And I have observed English politicians at times apt either unduly to suspect the supposed particular intentions of German statesmen, or alternatively to think that good may be done by indulging in vague and sentimental appeals to them. Now German policy is largely influ-

enced by Prussia. It is the habit of mind of Prussians to begin by defining a principle and then to test everything by it. They are not fond of gush, and are surprised if anyone doubts that the natural point of departure should naturally be to lay down clearly as a preliminary to discussion what they hold to be the interest of Germany. It is well to realise this habit of thought, and to take account of it. To ignore it is only to get ourselves misunderstood, and probably supposed to be concealing some hidden counter-policy. German habits of thinking in abstract terms, even when dealing with the most immediate and practical affairs, and of looking for principles everywhere, make things at times trying for those who have not this useful if difficult habit of mind in the same degree.

Then the German language is another cause of hindrance to Englishmen. It is in a high measure precise, but it does not lend itself like French, or even like English, to the expression of *nuances*. And when it appears in a translation, the *nuances* are generally not there at all, and the meaning is apt to seem harsh. I wish all our politicians who concern them-

selves with Anglo-German relations, those who are pro-German as well as those who are not, could go to Berlin and learn something, not only of the language and intellectual history of Prussia, but of the standpoint of her people—and of the disadvantages as well as the advantages of an excessive lucidity of conception. Nowhere else in Germany that I know of is this to be studied so advantageously and so easily as in Berlin, the seat of government, the headquarters of *Realpolitik*, and it seems to me most apparent among the highly educated classes there. It would be a good thing to get more understanding of personal equations than is current amongst us Englishmen. If judges and merchants and diplomatists can be led into wrong impressions, how much more are the multitudes here, who have no direct knowledge of foreign habits of mind, likely to make mistakes. And what is true of us is true of the Germans themselves. We also have some admirable qualities which are obscured by our other characteristics. It requires life among us, and knowledge of our ways and of our language, to disentangle the true relation and

character of these qualities. If the process is once started it is not difficult to continue. Frenchmen and Russians now appreciate us more than they did, simply because improved international relations have at last led them to look for our good qualities rather than to look on our deficiencies. A similar change for the better has even now come over our relations with our relatives in the United States. What an excellent thing it would be for the peace of the world if the process were to set in all round, so that just as we and the French and the Russians and the Americans have found a strong inclination to look for and believe in the best in each other, the same tendency were to set in as between the Germans and ourselves. There is no apparently insuperable reason why in forming a new friendship we should not carry on other and older friendships, and carry them with us into the new one to the profit of everyone concerned. Such a change might not supersede considerations of self-defence, but its tendency would probably be in the direction of lightening the financial burdens which these entail.

What is wanted is, then, education in mutual understanding. That is why this gathering at Oxford is of more than local importance. I can think of few things more desirable for the world at this moment than that England and Germany should come to understand each other. But such mutual understanding is not possible excepting on the basis of study, and the knowledge that is born of it. On the whole, I think we are more deficient in this study than are the Germans. They know our literature and our history much better than we do theirs. Shakespeare and Scott are almost as familiar to them as they are to ourselves. For one Briton that can read and speak German there are five Germans that can read and speak English. On the other hand, they seem to me to know almost less of our way of looking at things than we do of theirs. We are not really a nation that conceals deep-laid plans and selfish schemes under the guise of obscurity in word and deed. We do not seek, as of set principle and purpose, to annex more and more of the surface of the earth in advance of all others. What we have actually done in

this direction we have done—not as the outcome of any preconceived and thought-out policy, but because for a long time we were the only people on the spot, and because at the moment it was the obvious thing to do, and we were the only people ready to do it. Germany seems to me to have had one particular piece of ill luck, the misfortune of having been born as a nation a hundred years late in the world's history. The fact has modified the form of what otherwise would have been her mode of development. But it need not materially hamper her progress. She is already one of the greatest nations in the world in virtue of character and intellectual endowment. Her power of organisation is unrivalled. She has high standards of excellence in her methods, and great aptitude for what is actual and concrete. She is penetrating everywhere, and to the profit of mankind. Nothing is likely to keep her back—and I think I may add that nothing is so likely to smooth her path as really frank and easy relations, in commerce, in politics, in society, with this country. For some of us—a great many of us—believe that the greater

the trade and commerce of Germany the greater will be our trade and commerce. Co-operation in development is a great factor for all concerned.

No doubt there are subjective difficulties. I have already referred to those occasioned by the barrier erected by the peculiarities of the German language. It possesses advantages but it also possesses disadvantages, and causes somewhat of a gulf between the German and his foreign neighbours. One cannot, however appreciative one may be of things German, but make certain complaints of this language. The verb is remote from the substantive, and is a sore trial to the foreigner. The Gothic type and the *Kursiv-Schrift* are oppressions to the foreign eye. In the hands of a bad writer this language is a burden even to the student. Carlyle himself, a real admirer of German literature, has to say in his *Frederick the Great* that "German to this day is a frightful dialect for the stupid, the pedant, and the dullard sort. Only in the hands of the gifted does it become supremely good." But I sometimes think that even the Germans themselves do not appreciate the power that

is latent in their language of being made admirable for all purposes when the pen is that of a great master of style. I do not speak of the lyric. We all know that for the purposes of lyrical poetry German has hardly a rival. I speak of prose. I again refer for an illustration to Heinrich Heine. When I visit Düsseldorf it is with sadness that I see no mark to show that the town is proud of its association with his name. He was trying at times. He laughed at his countrymen. But then he laughed at us Englishmen also, and perhaps he laughed most of all at the French. He really knew and loved Germany, and yet Germany can hardly be said to appreciate him, and this the fact notwithstanding that he wrote German prose as perhaps no other ever has. We have learned to marvel at the young Goethe, who before he was twenty-six had produced much of his greatest work, the *Ur-Faust*, *Goetz*, *Werther*, and some of the finest of his lyrics. But of Heine we hear little in Germany. I think it is a sign of a certain want of open-mindedness that Germany does not fully appreciate this unique figure—the man who knew so much and said it so dis-

tinctly in such perfect words. In Heine St Beuve has his rival in delicacy of appreciation. The language of Renan is not more exquisitely graceful and precise. And yet there is, so far as I know, no important memorial to him in Germany—not even in Düsseldorf, his birth-place.

We are all prone to the unconsciousness which comes from being narrow, we here in England at least as much as our neighbours. We overlook, for instance, that in the nineteenth century we produced two literary figures and two only of European reputation, Byron and Scott. Byron never attained to maturity, and Scott is full of padding. So is Goethe for that matter, at least the Goethe of later life. But Germany in the end of the eighteenth and the beginning of the nineteenth century had her Elizabethan age—so far as literature and philosophy were concerned. How much poorer would the whole world be but for this period of German life in which she for the time outstripped every other country! Yet even then she indulged in tendencies which needed correction; and if she had listened to Heinrich Heine they might

have been corrected and the outlook enlarged. And now the *revanche* is in progress, much as Heine predicted, and, looking at the German railway bookstalls, I can see that a Gallic spirit is advancing on Berlin. It need not have been so and it should not have been so, and Heine told of a better way. Had his counsel been listened to, there ought to have been no Nietzsche period—so at least it seems to a foreigner.

I repeat that we English are apt to be narrow. We provoke the world by our apparent unconsciousness of the transitory nature of national institutions. Change is the order of the day. What will the world be like a hundred years hence? No one can foresee. Can the centralised Russian Empire hold together in the face of the march of civilisation, and the progress of Japan and China also? Will not these countries afford examples which will be followed outside their own boundaries? Will the German Empire a hundred years hence be anything like what it is to-day? And how will it be with the British Empire? Few people suppose that, even if George the Third had not been foolish,

the United States would have remained bound up with us and subject to a centralised Government. Some of us are quite aware that with Canada and Australia and New Zealand and South Africa the same difficulty might well arise unless great care is taken. Few people now talk of a rigid system of Imperial Federation on the old lines of a quarter of a century since. The proposition would be an anachronism and too dangerous. If Canada, for example, were to develop eighty millions of a population, could we remain with her under any sort of apparently written or rigid system? Possibly! It all depends how elastic the system really was, how light the réign of common Government, and how complete the autonomy of the Canadians. By learning to see things as others see them we may put off, perhaps for an indefinite period, days which, if there were constraint or lack of intelligence, would be inevitable. And that is why we do well to study the lesson of how to understand our neighbours all round, those who speak English and those who speak German, and to try to correct

certain insular traits of mind which are characteristic of us.

The Greeks used to say that the knowledge of self is the hardest to gain of all kinds of knowledge, and this is as true of nations as it is of individuals. But it is surely worth while to make the effort to gain the knowledge. For it may help us to secure that in the particular case we are considering, that of Germany and Great Britain, neither of two great nations shall fail to realise the magnitude of its responsibility for the understanding and appreciation of the other.

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